TRADE-MARKS, MONOPOLY, AND THE
RESTRAINT OF COMPETITION
SIGMUND TmimmG*

INTRODUCTION

Patents and copyrights were decisively deprived, during the 1947 term of the
Supreme Court, of their potency for commercial regulation contrary to the antitrust
laws.' Why then, should trade-marks, in so many aspects Jess substantial than
patents and copyrights, still present antitrust problems?
Patents and copyrights have the specific constitutional blessing of the Founding
Fathers; trade-marks have none. Patents and copyrights stress standards of inventiveness and artistic expression and are hallmarks of originality; they call for a high
level of understanding and sagacity on the part of both their utilizers and their
audience. Successful trade-marks, on the other hand, are largely matters of giving
conventional forms of syllabification and ornamentation a reiteration prolonged and
attractive enough to evoke a conditioned reflex on the part of their audience-the
so-called consumer response. It was Judge Learned Hand, and no crusading sociologist, who said in a trade-mark case that "The art of advertising spuriously reinforced
a genuine demand by the power of reiterated suggestion."' Furthermore, a view
has always been strongly held that a trade-mark is, at best, a qualified type of
property, designed primarily to ward off unfair competition, rather than an independent type of property such as a patent or a copyright.
On the other hand, for large corporations desirous of promoting a monopoly or
advancing a trade restraint, a trade-mark or trade name has its advantages. The
trade-mark "monopoly," limited though it may be to a- segment of the English
language or of the art of design, is a perpetual one. Unlike a patent, a mark or name
is not limited to a specific product or class of products, but can cover all products
worked on or distributed by a single firm. Furthermore, in an era when the consumer is beleaguered by a host of commodities of whose production he can know
nothing, he must order by ear rather than sight or touch, and a monopoly of the
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only familiar or convenient way to describe a commodity to a consumer--"Worcester-

shire sauce" or "linoleum," for example-gives the owner of this semantic monopoly
a strong competitive advantage. 3 Competitors who must resort to elaborate chemical names, for example, to denote a common drugstore product like aspirin, or an
industrial product like cellophane, are blocked from access to our market-minded
economy.

Furthermore, copyrights are, to all practical intents, limited to the media

of mass communication and edification, and, for the bulk of American industry,
patents are now concerned with relatively minor improvements in technology, at a
time when American courts have been raising the level of inventiveness necessary to
the validity of patents. Trade-marks and trade names, directed as they are to
distribution rather than production, have thus by comparison expanded their prominence on the American industrial scene.
While the economic significance of trade-marks has thus become greater, there
was not, until the beginning of 1949, a single litigated case bearing directly on the
relationship between trade-marks and the Sherman Act. Some businesses, therefore, had begun to look hopefully at the trade-mark as an affirmative defense for
trade restraints which could clearly no longer be regarded as valid as an exercise
of rights under patents or copyrights. Concurrently, the Antitrust Division had
launched a series of cases in which the use of trade-marks was regarded as a primary
and direct source of antitrust violation.
Whether trade-marks are a threat or an incentive within the American competitive system (they can of course be both) can best be gauged after we have reviewed, first, the antitrust history of trade-marks and trade names prior to the
enactment of the Lanham Act and, second, the provisions of the Lanham Act
possessing antitrust significance.
II
TRADE-MARKS

AS

Dnmar RESTRAxNTs OF TRADE

It has been fashionable in the last ten years to pose the question whether trade-

marks are an antitrust problem, and to conclude that trade-marks per se do not
involve monopoly or the restraint of competition, but that they may be reinforcing
and peripheral elements of schemes for the illegal restraint of trade, the illegality
of which is complete and evident before the trade-mark features of the scheme are
reached. Such a conclusion may fit the actual litigation program of the Antitrust

Division in the trade-mark field in the past, but it appears somewhat deficient as
applied to the larger facts of social and economic life.
'Lea v. Deakin, x5 Fed. Cas. 95, No. 8,154 (N. D. Il1. 1879); Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch.
D. 834 (878).

'The chemical name for aspirin is "acetyl salicylic acid" or "monoaceticacidester of salicylicacid."
See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505, 510 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). Cellophane, when you come
right down to it, is transparent glycerinated cellulose hydrate regenerated from viscose. See DuPont
Cellophane- Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. 2d 75 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
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A. Trade-marks as a Direct Vehicle of Monopoly Power
Perhaps the most striking illustration of trade-marks as a direct source of monopoly power is the situation to which American Tobacco Company v. United States'
was directed. In 1947, after the Supreme Coiirt had affirmed the criminal conviction
of the three leading cigarette manufacturers of the country for violation of the
antitrust laws, those three manufacturers had 84.7 per cent of total cigarette sales.
The three leading trade-marked brands (one brand to a manufacturer) accounted
for 8o.2 per cent of the domestic market sales of cigarette tobaccos.' After reviewing
the other factors affecting competition in the tobacco industry, some students have
concluded that competition will be hard to restore unless these valuable trade-marks,
and the advertising expenditures in connection therewith, are in some way brought
under control. The soap industry, also involving highly advertised trade-marked
commodities marketed by a very few firms, may present a similar pr6blem, since
7
the three largest soap companies control an estimated 8o per cent of total production.
Trade-mark protagonists contend that trade-marks promote competition by
pointing to a common source of origin for all articles with the same mark, thereby
enabling the consumer to make an informed choice among competitively produced
or marketed articles. It is in this sense that the protection of a trade-mark is the
protection of the trade-mark owner and the general public against unfair competition, and an assurance of fair competition. Inherent in such an approach is the
further assumption that it is trade-mark protection which makes quality competition
possible.
Professors Chamberlin and Brown do not believe that this is what actually takes
place s They say instead that the result of effective trade-mark promotion is to
differentiate the trade-marked article from other trade-marked and nontrade-marked
articles possessing the same general physical and chemical characteristics and the
same utility to the consumer, and to create for the trade-marked article a monopoly
and an immunity from the rigors of competition. The trade-mark creates for its
specific product an entirely separate market, where demand becomes inelastic and
prices are established which are independent of the prices of other articles of the
same class that would otherwise be competitive with it. Implicit in this analysis is
the notion that, particularly in dealing with goods of a character closely approaching
the fungible, the differentiation of a product accomplished by a trade-mark is necessarily spurious, because the trade-marked product is not in fact substantially different
from that of other articles of the same class. The trade-mark, and the advertising
9 328

U. S. 78X (1946).

c Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest, 57 YALE L. J. I 65, 1173 (1948).
"Fortune, April, 1939, PP. 77, 82.
' See EnwARD CsMAMEasuN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIsTc Co msPF€TON 56-70, 246-25o (5th ed.
1946); Brown, supra note 6. The reader, it is hoped, will pardon this indiscriminate merging of two
distinctive approaches to the problem. The first is that of the classical economist preoccupied with
whether the differentiation supplied by a trade-mark is consonant with the premises of free competition;
the second is that of the lawyer-sociologist and critic of the institution of advertising. In fact, the interested reader would do well to consult both.
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attendant upon the trade-mark, create in the consumer subjective illusions and expectancies of wide but indeterminate scope, and impart an element of economic irrationality to consumer demand, which is then assumed to justify a higher price for the
article. Society sltould not reward a trade-mark owner for such an anti-competitive,
intangible, and wasteful procedure.
Views of the type just outlined project us into conflicting considerations as to the
commercial morality and social utility of trade-marks, the dollar value of consumer
illusions, the irrationality of consumer choices, and the role of non-price competition
under the Sherman Act. Also, both implicit and explicit in the Chamberlin-Brow n
school of thinking is criticism of the institution of advertising. The trade-mark,
whatever its intellectual significance as an indicator of who gave the trade-marked
commodity its manufacturing or marketing "style," is clearly also a bearer of
advertising values. In certain situations, the skillful and massed use of advertising
expenditures has effectively created for a trade-marked commodity and its producer
or distributor a dominant or monopolistic position. To give other manufacturers
of the same commodity an opportunity to use the trade-mark would be one way of
diluting the values created by such strenuous advertising; this would reduce the
monopoly position of the original trade-mark owner, if it resulted in a diversion
of his business to the new users of the mark. Another possible way of meeting the
situation would be through the direct limitation of advertising expenditures by the
monopolistically situated trade-mark owner.
Here, as with respect to the tobacco and soap situations just outlined, the writer
must abstain from trying to resolve economic disputes with undoubtedly widespread
social ramifications but with thus far little accompanying legal grist. Before leaving
this controversial topic, however, we may note that the more conservative school
of trade-mark protection (and the one which is judicially accredited), which considers the trade-mark's sole function to be that of indicating source of origin," is
obviously less likely to be vulnerable to these strictures than those which would
claim for the trade-mark a more far-reaching significance as the conservator of independent property rights created by advertising.1" However, once the courts ceased
insisting that a trade-mark denote a known and particularized "source of origin"
and reconciled themselves to the notion that it could signify an anonymous "source
of origin," they did more than to create a metaphysical contradiction. They were
' Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. II1 (1938); Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.
2d 972, 973 (C. C. A. 2d 1928); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., supra note 4; RooEas,
NEW CoNCE"PTS OF UNFAIR CoMPRTrrsON UNDER TnE LANHAM AcT 203 (Practising Law Institute Lecture
Dec. Ii, X947).

" See Schechter, The Rational Badis of Trademark Protection, 40 HAsv. L. REV. 813 (1927); Isaacs,
i2io (1931). There seems to be more enthusiasm for this
view among legal writers than among judges. To this writer, the cases still seem to favor the "source
of origin" theory, although modern business conditions have deprived the source of origin of the continuity
and specificity that was possible in a less mechanized world. See Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd.
Muelhens, Inc., 43 F. 2d 937 (C. C. A. 2d 1930), including the dissenting opinion of Judge Learned
Hand therein.
Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HARv. L. REv.
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at least recognizing that the differentiation accomplished by a trade-mark is not
precise. Whether such a legal position is the equivalent of the Chamberlin-Brown

economic position that a trade-mark does not in fact effect a differentiation of source
of origin is unclear. In any event, however, the problem is of considerable commercial significance. Druggists and physicians, for example, constantly complain
that the pharmaceutical manufacturers flood the market with identical products
under many different brand names, thereby creating unduly heavy physical inventories for the druggist and unduly exacting mental inventories for the physician."
Furthermore, modern industrial society is passing -rapidly from the polite and
leisurely days of the individual trader, whose "custom" was specifically sought by
individual purchasers, to the hurly-burly of standard specifications, routinized purchasing procedures and sales pressures, and inducements largely unrelated to the
essential needs of the production or distribution process. In the simple situation of
the individual trader, a trade-mark served a valuable competitive function in differentiating trader Smith from trader Jones. However, as sellers and buyers alike lose
their specific human identity and become corporate complexes with an unpredictable
admixture of institutional and human elements, the question may well be raised
whether the differentiation accomplished by a trade-mark serves any such clear-cut
2
competitive purpose.'
As to whether a trade-mark, even in its limited r6le of indicating source of
origin, is of benefit to the consumer, thoughtful judges have been skeptical. Judge
Frank says that, while the trade-mark is presumed to benefit the corisumer, it does
not do so in fact but rather operates as a boon to the producer (and only in that
respect to the competitive system) by increasing the producer's incentive to produce and sell: however, consumer benefit is a factor which the courts can take into
account in deciding how far to validate trade-name monopolies.' 3 Judge Learned
Hand has indicated, in an analogous connection, that "if buyers wish to be snobs,
the law will protect them in their snobbery" 4--judicial ratification of Veblen's
"conspicuous consumption" theory! And Judge Frank has also pointed out that
trade-marks will be protected against infringement even where the deception
practiced on the consumer is to his financial advantage.' Thus, while there has
been intellectual acceptance by judges of the premises of Chamberlin's critique, they
have been disinclined to do more about it than to give trade-marks a narrower
and more strictly defined scope than has been given them in the past.
" MacCarteny, The Pharmaceutical Change of Life, J. AM. PHARMAcEUrnCAL Ass'x

(PntarecAL
672, 673 (Nov. 1948); Hardt, Product Development, Promotion and Marketing, in A. E.
SMITH AND A. D. HERRICK (Ens.), DRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 451, 459 (1948).
PARmt.cy

ED.)

" Deep as is this author's admiration for the profound historical researches of Professor Schechter in
this field, he is somewhat afraid that in the course of getting us back to the age of Damascus steel and
the guild system Professor Schechter may be diverting us from the (largely disturbing) realities of this
present impersonal and abstract era.
" See his concurring opinion in Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151 F. 2d 34 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
Benton Announcements, Inc. v. F. T. C., 130 F. 2d 254, 255 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
"See
"5 Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F. 2d 955 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), cert. denied,
320 U. S. 758 (1943); see also Standard Brands v. Smidler, supra note 13.
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Nor will we find that the conventional legal cliche that trade-mark protection is
justified as a method of preventing "unfair competition" throws any light on the
question whether trade-marks promote "competition" in fact. After all, price-cutting
is regarded by many as "unfair competition," yet the customary industry effort to
stifle price-cutting by "chiselers" would not only be regarded as anti-competitive but
usually violates the antitrust laws. What does the law of "unfair competition" mean
in so far as trade-mark matters are concerned? It means that competition must
be so conducted (and in the ultimate analysis so regulated) that it conforms to certain orthodox concepts of what is not unfair. At its lower level, this means that we
should not resort to fraud or chicanery in the competitive struggle. In purely economic terms, the only possibility of real fraud is that the purchaser of a trade-marked
article is deceived into believing that the seller of the article owns the trade-mark
thereon and is the manufacturer thereof, whereas the seller is in fact neither. In
legal terms, the buyer is deceived as to "source of origin" of the trade-marked article;
this, it will be noted, is as far as the courts have gone in conferring trade-mark
protection. In broader social terms, by giving trade-marks this type of protection,
society is superimposing an ethical and moral norm on the competitive process-a
norm which may be regarded as neutral as far as (orthodox) competition is
concerned.
Once we try to raise the level of what constitutes "unfair competition" above
the prevention of fraud and deceit, we express no longer a concept of "unfair competidon" which is basic to the consumer's way of thinking, but rather concepts that are
in the mind of (usually established) producers. Businessmen honestly believe that
they have built up, by diligent trade-mark promotion and advertising, a good will
and custom, an assurance of quality and satisfaction, that it would be "unfair" to
allow their competitors to appropriate. In economic terms, they assert that they
'have built up a good will that they have a right to conserve and keep others from
capitalizing on. In legal terms, they claim a vested interest and a property right.in
the good will of their trade-mark, and the right to exclude others therefrom. In
broadly social terms, they are asking for an immunity from the rigors of competition
and that society recognize the validity of an anti-competitive principle.
B. Resale Price Maintenance through Trade-Marks
While the purely judicial development of the law of trade-marks has not involved
either the adoption or the rejection of a public policy of creating an immunized
market for trade-marked commodities, the same has not been true on the legislative
front. In fact, legislatures have rushed in where the judicial angels feared to tread.
All except two states of the Union and the District of Columbia, through their Fair
Trade Acts, and the Federal Congress through the Miller-Tydings amendment to
the Sherman Act, allow the producer or the distributor of a trade-marked article to
fix the resale price of that article. ' By virtue of a single contract between the owner
" See S. C. Op'ENHEim, CASES ON THm F _AL. ANr-Thusrr LAws 385 (x948).
Strictly speaking,
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of a trade-mark and the purchaser of the trade-marked article, the resale price for
hundreds and perhaps thousands of wholesalers and retailers can be fixed."7 Absent
a trade-mark and such validating federal and state legislation, the fixing of a resale
price, even by one person, would be a violation of the antitrust laws.'" The MillerTydings Act is therefore recognized as an exception to the general policy of the
antitrust laws and has been narrowly construed. Thus, it is applicable only where
the trade-marked commodity is "in free and open competition with commodities of
the same general class produced by others."' 9 This, of course, assumes, contrary to
the economic theory we have just been discussing, that a trade-marked commodity can
be and should be in a competitive market embracing other rival commodities, rather
than in a separate and insulated market."
While ostensibly a vehicle for protecting a manufacturer's marks or brands, the
Miller-Tydings Act and the state statutes validating resale price maintenance contracts have been attacked as a heavily and hastily lobbied effort by established retailers
and chains (particularly those in the drug trade) to maintain a level of prices and to
ward off competition by so-called "pine-board independents."'" Although the exemption conferred by the Miller-Tydings Act is limited to vertical price fixing, the Act
and the state legislation operating in connection with it have served as a legal subterfuge for undercover efforts by retailers to fix prices horizontally in violation of the

Sherman Act.22 The Supreme Court has met this trend in an adequate doctrinal
manner by holding that the right of an individual producer to make resale price
maintenance contracts, or to refuse to sell to persons who will not enter into such
contracts, does not authorize a combination among producers, wholesalers, or competitors to compel resale price maintenance." Nor can a manufacturer, say of lens
blanks, use the Miller-Tydings Acts to impose resale prices on distributors who
the Miller-Tydings Act provides for resale price maintenance of articles bearing the "brand or name"
of the producer or distributor, as well as those carrying his trade-mark. However, it is questionable
whether the provision has any value for a producer or distributor if his competitors can "pirate" his
brand or name. Accordingly, the practical result is that brands and names tend to be trade-marked.
"?Professor Shulman thinks even this too generous a statement. He believes that the price under
fair trade acts is fixed by notice, not by agreement; if this is true, then the state fair trade act may not
qualify for the protection afforded by the Miller-Tydings Act. See Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and
the Law of Restrictive Agreements 4ffecting Chattels, 49 YALE L. J. 607, 619 (1940).
"8 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (191).
"oEastman Kodak Co. v. F. T. C., x58 F. 2d 592 (C. C. A. 2d 1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S.
828 (946).
" "Hence it will not do to say that all film is in the same class. If a purchaser wants a color film,
he must be able to buy it from more than one manufacturer if there is to be 'free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class'; that he can buy a black and white film will not serve to
destroy the monopoly of the sole producer of color film." Circuit Judge Swan in Eastman Kodak Co.
v. F. T. C., supra note 19, at 594.

"Memorandum by Corwin Edwards, in FINAL

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS OF TH

TEMPORARY

NATIONAL ECONOMic CoMMiTrEE 232 et seq. (1941); Shulman, supra note 17, at 616-617.

"See United States v. Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern California, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 974 (S. D.
9 th 1943); California Retail Grocers and Merchants Association, Ltd. v. United States, 139 F. 2d 978 (C. C. A. 9 th 1943), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 729 (X944).
"United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293 (1945).

Calif. 1942), afj'd, 139 F. 2d 973 (C. C. A.
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sell a processed version of the finished article, i.e., finished lenses. 4 Furthermore,
even where resale price maintenance contracts are valid in and of themselves, they
will be canceled if they are a "patch upon an illegal system of distribution."2
Waiving any issue as to the desirability of the Miller Tydings Act per se,2"' and
sound as the Supreme Court has been in guarding against that statute's abuse, the
question may therefore well be raised whether the use of a trade-mark or brand in
resale price maintenance contracts does not have economic consequences inconsistent
with the basic premise of the Sherman Act 2
C. Trade-marks as a Monopoly of Language
When we come to the area where allowance of a claim for trade-mark protection
becomes, in the language of Judge Freed, "tantamount to the gift of exclusive ownership of the use of an English word, '' we run into some very serious problems indeed. Let us distinguish simply between what I shall call generic and specific symbols. A generic symbol signifies-in the sense of uniquely pointing to or denoting
-- either a class of products or a general quality of a product (in trade-mark parlance, generic or descriptive names), e.g., "cola," "white." A specific symbol symbolizes-in the sense of more or less equivocally evoking or connoting-the maker
or merchandiser of an article, the larger corporate complex in which the individual
maker or merchandiser is a submerged unit, the particularly melodious crooner or
effective radio saga sponsored by the corporate complex, or some specific quality,
sensation, or emotional association attributed to the symbolized article,2 e.g., "U. S.
S., "Swan" (for soap), "Lyons" (for tooth powder).
It would be incongruous for a competitive distributive economy to allow any
single legal individual to appropriate exclusive rights over general symbols. If
manufacturers or traders are foreclosed from naming the product they are trying to
market or from describing its qualities, they are effectively and completely debarred
from access to the market. It is, therefore, sound for the courts to hold that the
",United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241,

252 (1942).

" See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 724 (1944).

"a The Federal Trade Commission, the Antitrust Division, and numerous consumer and farm groups
have expressed opposition to the Miller-Tydings Act and state resale price maintenance legislation. In
fact, most manufacturing groups are indifferent or negative with respect to these laws; it is mainly
those manufacturers that are confronted with cohesive and persistent wholesale and retail distributor
associations which are following the path of resale price maintenance. See REP oRT OF FEDERAL TRADE
CoMMissioN oN REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (945); Assistant Attorney General Herbert A. Bergson,
Current Problems in the Enforcement of the Antitrust Law, address before the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Feb. 17, 1949; H. R. 4003, 8ist Cong., ist Sess., introduced April 4, 1949
(calling for repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act); MacGregor, "Fair Trade" Laws Seen Losing Favor, N. Y.
Times, May 22, 1949, S3, P. a, Col. 3; Review and Outlook, Wall Street Journal, May x2, x949, p. 4.
" Resale price contracts are currently used primarily in the drug, cosmetic, toilet goods, liquor,
gasoline, and book-selling fields, and more occasionally in the sale of household appliances, sporting
goods, foods, clothing, rubber products, radios, and tolacco. REPoRT OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE Ivi(1945).

ITMajestic Mfg. Co. v. Majestic Electric Appliance Co., Inc., 76 U. S. P. Q. 525, 526 (N. D. Ohio

1948).

"8A more detailed enumeration of different meanings of a trade-mark in legal writings is to be
found in Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HAxv. L. Rav. 1210,

1220

(193).
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public domain of the English language may not be pre-empted and that no trademark rights inhere in generic symbols like "argyrol" or "red." It is also sound
commercial practice for trade-mark counsel to urge their clients to choose artificial
and meaningless names, rather than names with possible descriptive connotations.i
However, the advice of advertising men runs counter to that of trade-mark counsel,
and, therefore, businesses frequently adopt trade-marks that are generic symbols, ie.,
marks that name or describe general types of products.
The courts, using common law and common sense, have theoretically been the
best protectors of the general public and of competitors against the exclusive appropriation by any one person of words necessary to name or describe articles of commerce. It is only occasionally that this protection is accorded in an antitrust proceeding. Thus, in United States v. Albany Chemical Company, the defendant was
charged with conspiring with the Trade Mark Title Company to violate the Sherman Act by fraudulently registering with the Secretary of State of New York as its
exclusive trade-mark the mark-mirabile dictu--"aspirin," and intimidating competitors by threatening suits for the infringement of that mark.?" Usually, the judicial protection flows from a sober analysis of the function of trade-marks. By insisting that descriptive and generic marks be open to the public, giving laudatory
and honorific marks a limited protection, and curbing the trend to have a person
protected in his trade name or trade-mark even for articles he does not produce nor
intend to produce, the courts have implicitly recognized that a monopoly of a facility
of mass communication such as a trade-mark may promote trade restraint as effectively as a monopoly of a facility of mass commodity transportation like a stockyard
The difficulty with the courts is that while their general phior a rail terminal.'
losophy of the law and function of trade-marks is intelligent and forward-looking,
their resolution of specific trade-mark disputes is frequently somewhat murky and
oracular, and too deliberative and time-consuming to aid a small businessman without trade-mark protection and without the resources to do legal battle against an entrenched owner of a trade-mark.
There is a further difficulty inherent in the nature of language, and specifically
of the English language. The English vocabulary is, as everyone knows, one of
the most grasping, expansive, and flexible in the world; there are no Forty Immortals,
as in France, to ban the entry of the jejune and immature word. A great part of
the growth of the English language, unlike Continental languages, is due to its
ready assimilation of trade names, the invention of which, at least in i919, was "not
"' See LIDDY, TRADEMARKS FROM MANUFACT3RERS' AND RETAILERS' POINTS OF VIEW 47-48 (Practising
HANDLER, TRADEMARKS AND THE ANrImRuSr LAws 229 (Practising
Law Institute Lecture, Jan. 8, 1948).
" Eq. No. 20-232, S. D. N. Y., settled by final decree entered Jan. xo, 1921.
" Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945) (press news) with Swift and Co. v.
United States, 196 U. S. 375 (19o5) (stockyards) and United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S.
214 (1922) (railroad terminals).

Law Institute Lecture, Nov. 6, 1947);
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a customary procedure on the part of foreign advertisers."3' 2 Names of so-called
fanciful origination are continually in process of becoming commonplaces of conventional description, and in fact are frequently the only way of describing certain
products, as in the pharmaceutical industry (mercurochrome, aspirin).
In short, specific symbols, even those of a most arbitrary nature, are continually
being given broader coverage and transmuted into generic symbols. Within a gena3
eration, the mark "cola" had traversed the road from specificity to genericness.
It is a frequent consequence of the promotion of even an unfamiliar trade-mark or
trade name that it becomes an indispensable way of describing the trade-marked
product; in fact, it is a consequence frequently intended by enterprising sales departments. However, the determination of when a word has become incorporated in a
language as a descriptive or generic term is necessarily a subjective and statistical
one. Paradoxically enough, names which the Pure Food and Drug Administration
considers "common or usual," so that under its labeling statute it requires persons
manufacturing or marketing a food or drug to identify it by that name on the label,
may nevertheless not be considered "common descriptive names" finder the Lanham
Act.34 Also, this a field where appellate judges seem to attach little weight to the
factual determinations of a trial court; with apparently complete abandon they reach
for the encyclopedia or resort to the direct questionnaire technique3 5 Under the circumstances, therefore, the owner of a trade-mark who has, by his own investment and
labor, built it up into familiarity may well be pardoned a reluctance to concede it that
degree of familiarity which would deprive him of his hard-earned good will and
result in dedicating the mark to the public. Dr. Vizetelly, the lexicographer, has
pointed attention to the characteristic schizophrenia of manufacturers who sponsor
a product that is winning popular acclaim: first they court a place for the trade-mark
in the dictionary; then they try to remove it to keep it from becoming over-popular 0
"See

Brander Matthews, The Advertiser's Artful Aid, 48 BOOYMAN 659, 662 (1918-1919).

Para-

doxically, however, words like "Kodak" and "Vaseline," while held down to trade-mark status in the
United States and England, have entered most continental languages. See HENRY L. MENcEEN, THE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE 172-173 ( 4 th ed. 1938); id. Supp. 1, 342 (1945).

"See Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F. 2d 788 (C. C. A. soth 1943), upholding the
reopening of a constant decree to permit a hitherto debarred defendant to use the word. Another example is "Zipper," which was coined by B. F. Goodrich Company in 1913, registered by it in 1925,
upheld in 1930; see B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hockmeyer, 40 F. 2d 99 (C. C. P. A. 5930).

Goodrich still

claimed it as a trade-mark in the footwear field in 1944, but Life magazine (which should be an outstanding authority on this subject) said in 1938 that it had passed into the English language. It is hard
to appreciate that "Singer" was once the generic name denoting sewing machines. See Singer Mfg. Co.
v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. z69 (x896); or that "Goodyear Rubber" was a descriptive name describing,
of course, Goodyear's invention. See Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber
Co., 128 U. S. 598 (1888); or that one of the first labels for gasoline was "petrol." See Hutton,
Get Out and Get Under-Motoring Fifty Years Ago, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1948, pp. o, 42.
"Derenberg, The Lanham Trademark Act and Its Impact on the Drug Industry, 37 T. M. REP. 392
(947); Derenberg, Some Unique Features in the Selection and Protection of Pharmaceutical TradeMarks, 4 FooD, DRUG AND CosM. L. Q. 137 (1949).
1

" Frank, J., dissenting in La Touraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F. 2d 115, 120 (C.
C. A. 2d 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 771 (1946); Frank, J., dissenting, in Triangle Publications v.
Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 969, 976 (C. C. A. ad 1948).
"See Vizetelly, Pillaging the Language, xSo ArLANrse MorTLY 228-234 (932).
If the Hawkes
Bill, S. 1919, passes, dictionary publishers will think twice before they rashly insinuate that a registered
mark has become a part of English speech, because they will render themselves subject to a cause of
action by the trade-mark owner for any careless attribution of genericness to such a mark.
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Thus it often becomes worth the trade-mark owner's while to insist on a thorough
judicial ventilation of the issue of genericness-a ventilation which blows down all
competitors but those possessed of the financial capacity for enduring slow, costly,
and uncertain litigation. Entrepreneur A, who has invested a great deal of advertising in a mark and by his diligence and exertions converted unfamiliar words or
phrases like "aspirin" and "shredded wheat!' into household words, quite naturally
resists the factual inferences and legal conclusions, based on his promotional success,
that deprive him of the fruits of his labors. Newly arrived businessman B, who
wants to enter a market and feels he is doomed to failure unless he too can use the
magic password, understandably enough feels that the alleged mark is an indispensable part of the common argot. Given equally strong convictions and resources,
the dispute is settled only by protracted judicial proceedings entailing long delay and
unpredictable expense and outcome. In the majority of cases, the nouveau arriv
does not have the resources or stamina to withstand these legal and judicial rigors.
It may be most gratifying to find out that "Shredded Wheat" has been in the public
domain since 1912; but how many small businesses can take the necessary gamble
of possible defeat and pay counsel and court fees from 1912 to 1938, when that determination was finally and authoritatively made?37
D. Summary
In retrospect, therefore, trade-marks, in addition to their role as facilitating or enforcement mechanisms for competitive restraints independently desired by private
parties, may directly promote restraint of trade. Thus, for example, trade-marks may
on occasion be the direct vehicles whereby monopoly power is consciously brought
to bear on actual or potential competitors. Furthermore, protagonists of classical
competitive theory urge that trade-marks undermine the proper basis of competition
contemplated by the antitrust laws, because the demand for a trade-marked commodity persists and is inelastic, regardless of what is attempted by would-be competitors in the way of ordinary price competition. In other cases, owners of trademarks or trade names become unconscious, albeit willing, monopolists because the
trade-marks or names are indispensable means of describing commodities in the
market place. It may well be that these direct, and perhaps often unintended, consequences of the use of the trade-mark are socially more important than the positive
and purposive use of trade-marks to abet illegal conspiracies. Allied with these
considerations is the fact that the functioning of the trade-mark system may place
small business at a great relative disadvantage compared with big business, and may
thereby promote the concentration of economic power in this country faster than
antitrust proceedings in the trade-mark field can dissipate such concentration.
In the foregoing discussion we have been talking about mixed commerciallinguistic developments that need not necessarily result in a strictly demonstrated
'Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. XII (1938).
The basic design patent expired in
i912. However, Shredded Wheat has been known to the public since 1894, and the mark had been
denied registration in 1905.
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antitrust violation, but which may nevertheless involve serious competitive disadvantages for small and new business. This theme of small-business3 8 disadvantage
will be elaborated when we discuss the Lanham Act later on.
III
TRADE-MARKS AS FACILITATING RESTRAINTS OF TRADE

A. Division of Territories
Most of what has thus far been written about trade-marks and restraint of trade

has to do with the use of trade-marks to help maintain illegal international cartel
arrangements. The typical arrangement is one whereby concerns in different countries, by agreement, use a common trade-mark, but only one concern has the use
of the mark in any one country. That concern is therefore able, by enforcing or
threatening to enforce the trade-mark through judicial infringement proceedings

and before the customs authorities, to exclude other concerns from its own home
markets and from other areas where it has the exclusive right to the mark. The

reader would do well to consult the prior literature for a more detailed treatment
of how the mark "Plexiglas" in the field of acrylic plastics, the name "Merck" in
the field of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, the New Jersey Zinc trade-mark in the
zinc field, and the mark "Mazda" in the electric lamp industry helped reserve
American markets for American firms free of competition from foreign firms, and
curtailed the export trade of this country for those industries.P
Those who urge that it is not the trade-mark but the antecedent contractual arrangements and intentions of the parties that produce the trade restraint are only
partially correct. In the first place, it is notorious that parties to contracts repent

thereof, frequently try to extricate themselves therefrom, and often succeed. . A firm
which has agreed not to compete for a foreign market may be able to repudiate that
agreement, particularly if it happens to be an American firm that is violating its
" The following two quotations from Time relate to a lawsuit which Philadelphia's Fayette PR
Plumb, Inc., recently won in the Los Angeles District Court against the Los Angeles Plomb Tool
Company (named after Alphonse Plomb, one of the three founders of the firm). Los Angeles Plomb
applied in 19z6 to make its name a trade-mark, but was met by a protest by Philadelphia Plumb.

In

March, 1947, a Federal district court gave Los Angeles Plomb a year within which to stop using and
advertising its name (Plomb) as a trade-mark. At the beginning of December, 1948, the district
court "ordered Plomb of Los Angeles to: (i) fulfill last year's order at once, and (2) pay Plumb of
Philadelphia all the profits it had made since March 1948 on sales of tools marked 'Plomb.' To comply,
Plomb had to close down. Frantically appealing from the decision this week, the company estimated
that it would take at least four months, and cost around $S,ooo,ooo, to change over to a new trademark. In that time, said Plomb, its markets and most of its skilled help would be gone. In addition,
the company estimated that it would have to pay $500,000 in profits to Plumb and $40,000 in costs, a
loss that would be sorely felt. It looked as if tool buyers might never again be confused over Plomb
and "Plumb." Time, Dec. 6, 1948, p. 94.
About six weeks later the Los Angeles company opened with a new trade-mark. "Plomb President
Morris Pendleton, who is appealing the decision, said the new trade-mark was just a temporary expedient (estimated cost: $130,000) to resume business. 'We have been handed a lemon,' said he, 'so we are
making lemonade.'"

Time, Jan. 27, 1949, P. 84.

"See Diggins, Trademarks and Restraints of Trade, 32 Gao. L. J. 113 (1944); Borchardt .Are Trademarks an Antitrust Problem? 31 Gao. L. J. 245 (1943).
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own domestic law and public policy by such an agreement. However, if that same
American firm binds itself to use a mark that is registered abroad in the name of a
foreign competitor, that foreign competitor is able to exclude the trade-marked products of that American firm in perpetuity, so that the American firm has made an
irrevocable election to stay out of the foreign market. In other words, the often
weak contractual sanctions underlying agreements not to compete become reinforced
by the stouter sanctions of trade-mark infringement and customs barrier.4 ° As frequently happens with secondary and later-contrived defenses, they become stronger
than the original defense.
One may ask: Why cannot the American firm use another trade-mark for its
export business? The answer lies both in the distribution procedures and in the
technology of the industry involved. In some cases, such as ball bearings and
storage batteries, the trade-mark is actually stamped into the metal of the product,
so that expensive re-tooling operations might be involved.'
In practically all
cases the entire promotional and distributional system of a firm is geared to one or
two trade-marks. Advertising is international in scope, and one of the great advantages of having a single trade-mark is the intrinsically multilingual and universal character of the mark. To duplicate, for an entirely new mark, the advertising, packaging, and handling expenses and the lengthy development period that
went into establishing the good will behind an old and established mark would
place the company at a great competitive disadvantage. Furthermore, in many
cases, debarment from the use of the trade-mark that has had world-wide acceptance
over a long period of years (so that it has almost become generic) may be a wellnigh insuperable economic hazard.
Furthermore, private parties who execute ordinary cartel agreements can only
bind themselves to stay out of each other's territory; they cannot thus bind their
customers or other third parties not privy to their agreement. Where, however,
manufacturers are dealing with a trade-marked product, such as, let us say, magnetos,
arrangements made by them for the exclusive use of trade-marks in certain countries would exclude not only the manufacturers themselves, but also any distributors,
dealers, or exporters handling their product. Those interested in the freedom and
growth of our export business will therefore be particularly interested in guarding
against trade-mark restrictions that promote an international division of territories.
It may be of some interest to inquire what relief is possible and has been obtained
40 Sce §1526

of Tariff Act of 1930, 46 STAT. 741, i9 U. S. C. §1526 (1946).

This statute is

applicable even to articles imported for personal consumption. Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F. 2d
1035 (C. C. A. 2d 193). It is immaterial, of course, whether an illegal division of territories or
agreement not to compete is consciously reinforced by concurrent' trade-mark use by the parties or
whether, either before or after such unadorned illegal agreement is consummated, the parties independently build up trade-marks in their own territories that make subsequent competition impossible. World
economic Balkanization is the outcome in either event.
"* The example has been supplied of a tire balancer, where the stamped 'trade-mark had a substantial
effect on the balancers. See testimony of Elliott H. Moyer in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Patents
on H. R 82. 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1944).
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against the illegal division of territories by trade-mark. 42 It is, of course, elementary
that all illegal cartel agreements based on or involving trade-marks will be canceled,
their revival or renewal enjoined, and the defendant enjoined against refraining from
43
competition for any market covered by a trade-mark allotted to a cartel partner.
During the war, it was recognized that the economic activity of German private
business was directly harnessed to the war-making activities of the German government, and that "spearhead" concerns like Bayer, Merck, Schering, and SiemensSchuckert kept alive not only German economic influences in Latin American
countries but also promoted Nazi thinking and German political support. It was
therefore one of the aims of Allied economic warfare that these German spearhead
concerns be eliminated from those countries; and it subsequently became part of
the post-war program for the elimination of German economic-military potential
abroad that the old German industrial connections in Latin American and other
non-Axis countries not be re-established."

In situations where American and

German firms shared the same trade-mark, but the mark in South American
countries was registered in the name of the German firm, the American firm ex-

porting the trade-marked product was obviously excluded from the South American
market. When, during the war, an American firm continued to export trade-marked
products to a South American country under the mark registered in the name of its
German cartel associate, the net effect was to keep alive for that cartel associate
a market which the American firm might otherwise have pre-empted. To meet this
situation, consent judgments have therefore been entered enjoining the American
defendant from reserving, or undertaking to reserve, for a foreign cartel partner
any right or immunity to use or control the use in any market or country of any
trade-mark, trade name, or other designation in use by the American company.5
From the foregoing it seems clear that the problem of preventing international
division of territories by trade-mark continues to be, in cases where a German firm is
involved, not only a problem of promoting the general freedom of international trade
but also one of preventing Germany from re-arming and of insuring the security of
the world.
"IThe relief obtained by the Antitrust Division against trade-mark abuse has thus far been secured
by consent judgment. It may be noted that the usual injunctive provisions against allocation of territories and the impeding of exports of imports applicable to illegal international agreements based on
patents are applicable to similar illegal agreements based on trade-marks. Cf. Art. IV of Final judgment in United States v. General Electric Co. (D. N. J., Civ. Actions Nos. 1364 and 2590, entered
March 7, 1946).
"'See Arts. III and VI(G)(2) of Final Judgment in United States v. Merck & Co. (D. N. f., Civ.
Action No. 3159, entered Oct. 6, i945).

"'For a statement of the American Government's so-called economic warfare (replacement) and
safehaven (postwar economic disarmament) policies, see testimony of Assistant Secretary of State William
T. Clayton in Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Aflairs, pt. 2,
79th Cong., Xst Sess. 39 et seq. (1945).

The story of how I. G. Farben functioned as an instrument

of economic espionage and warfare is set forth in Part 7 of the Hearings at pp. 947-953, 992-1002.
" Art. VI(c) of Final Judgment in United States v. Merck & Co., supra note 43; Art. VI(c) of Final
Judgment in United States v. Rohm & Haas Co. (E.D. Pa., Civ. Action No. 9o68, entered Nov. 18,
1948).

TRADE-MARKS, MONOPOLY, AND THE RESTRAINT OF COMPETITION

337

Relief against trade-mark abuse is, of course, justified on the ground that it is

necessary to dissipate the effects of the abuse. However, it should derive additional
sanction from the fact that the abuse of a monopolistic privilege granted by law
results in the forfeiture, or the lessening, of that monopolistic privilege. This gen6
eral principle has been followed in the case of patents; there seems to be no apparent reason why a similar result should not attach in the case of that more tenuous
claimant to monopoly status-the trade-mark.
Relief obtained against international division of territories by trade-mark has
also included enjoining a defendant from conditioning any right or immunity under
a trade-mark upon a covenant, agreement, or understanding not to sell, or permit
7
the sale of, products for export or import in the United States, or from reserving
or granting to any person the right or power to prevent or restrict imports into any
country by giving such person the right or power to control trade-marks, trade names
or other designations used by the defendant 4 ' Similarly, a defendant may be
enjoined from requiring any person to restrict the trade-marks, trade names, or
other designations used in connection with products of the type manufactured
by the defendant to trade-marks, trade names, or designations owned or controlled
9
by the defendant in foreign markets
Of probably greater efficacy are provisions whereby the defendant gives up
completely its own use of specified trade-marks or names in connection with its
products or business, and engages not to maintain any trade-mark infringement
proceedings or take any other steps to prevent any person from using the marks or
names thus relinquished.50 Such a surrender facilitates imports by foreign competitors of the American trade-mark owners both into this country and into other
countries where the American firm had prior trade-mark protection. In order to
facilitate exports by American firms into countries from which they had hitherto
been excluded both by intention and by trade-marks, a recent consent judgment
provides that the defendant
take such steps and do such things as will eliminate any interference because of the trademarks or trade names used therewith, with the importation of any such type, line or classification of electric storage batteries into such country or area. Such steps may include, without limitation, the making available of electric storage batteries which do not bear, to the
defendant's knowledge, infringing trademarks or trade names, the preparation and dissemination of appropriate trade literature, and changes in the methods of packaging and
handling.51
"Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U. S. 488 (1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment
U. S. 386 (1945).
"Art. V(c) of Final Judgment in United States v Electric Storage Battery Co. (S. D. N. Y., Civ.

Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944); Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323
Action No. 31-225, entered Nov. 24, 1947).

"sArt. XII(a) of Final Judgment in United States v. Electric Storage Battery Co., supra note 47.

"Id. Art. XI(b).
10 Art. XIII of the Electric Storage Battery judgment, supra note 47, applies this rule to five trademarks owned by the Electric Storage Battery Company. Also, Chloride Electrical Storage Battery Co.,
Ltd., was authorized by the judgment to use its name in this country, a use which had hitherto been
barred by the existence of a trade-mark in this country owned by Electric Storage Battery Company.
l Id. Art. XI. See also similar language in Art. VI(B) of Amended Final Judgment in United
States v. American Bosch Corporation (S. D. N. Y., Civ. Action No. 2o-164, entered June 4, 1948).
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-Another recent consent judgment takes care of both export and import situations
by enjoining the defendant from assigning or granting to its German, English, and
French cartel partners, or to any other manufacturer or distributor of Bosch products
located outside of the United States, any exclusive license for any country of the
world in or to any trade-mark or trade name.52 The same defendant was also enjoined from interfering with or preventing, by trade-mark infringement proceedings
or other actions based on trade-mark or trade-name rights, any foreign business
manufacturing, selling, or distributing Bosch products from importing those products
into the United States under any name or designation rightfully attached to such
products, provided the importing firm takes appropriate steps to prevent confusion
of those products with those produced by American BoschY3 Probably the most
direct way of freeing the American export trade from trade-mark restraints would
be for a defendant to adopt a policy of selling to exporters either an untrade-marked
product or a product bearing a different trade-mark from those reserved to the
defendant's cartel partners in foreign countries.
Situations in which trade-marks figure in illegal international divisions of territory frequently also involve either distributors in a foreign country exclusively devoted to the sale of a cartel competitor's product or common distributors who may
exhibit a strong preference for a fellow cartelist's product. Also present in the
situation where cartel associates share a common trade-mark is a practice on the
part of the American defendant company of referring orders which emanate from
a market reserved by agreement and trade-mark arrangements for a foreign competitor, to that foreign competitor for fulfillment. 4 Injunctions have been obtained
in recent consent judgments against these additional objectionable features of the
international distribution of trade-marked products.""
The current scope of the international trade-mark and cartel problem is well delineated in the Government's recent proceeding against the Timken Roller Bearing
Company, decided by Judge Freed on March 3 of this year.' 0 Since i9o9, world
markets for tapered roller-type bearings, one of the most important types of antifriction bearings, have been divided between the Timken Roller Bearing Company
(American Timken) and a British concern, and competition therein has been eliminated. As a result of agreements more recently entered into, in 1928, 1934 and 1935,
and 1938, the entire world market for tapered roller bearings is divided into four
" Art. V(A) (f) of Amended Final Judgment in United States v. American Bosch Corporation, supra.
" Id. Art. V(A) (h).
", See, e.g., the complaint in United States v. SKF Industries, Inc. (N. D. Ohio, Civ. Action No.
24215), and United States v. Norma-Hoffman Bearings Corporation (N. D. Ohio, Civ. Action No.
24216).

"Arts. VIII(g) and XII(c) of the Electric Storage Battery judgment, supra note 47; Arts. V(A)(b),
(d), and (e) of the American Bosch Amended Judgment, supra note 55.
" United States v. Timken Roller Bearings Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N. D. Ohio 1949). Compare
also the complaints in United States v. SKF Industries, supra note 54 (roller bearings); United States v.
The Permutit Company (S. D. N. Y., Civ. Action No. 32-394) (water conditioning and purifying
equipment and materials); United States v. Decca Records Co. (S. D. N. Y., Civ. Action No. 46-779)
(phonograph records).
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areas: (i) the British Isles, the British Empire (except Canada), and Europe (except France and Russia), which are allocated to the British company; (2) France
and the French colonies and protectorates, which are allocated to a French concern;
(3) Russia, which is the joint territory of both Timken and the British company;
and (4) the rest of the world, including the United States, which is allocated to
American Timken. Sporadic sales were made by the co-conspirators in each other's
territories, but only to forestall outside competition. The agreements dividing foreign
territories and fixing prices in world markets prior to 1927 had ostensibly been based
on patent licenses. In time the significant patents expired; yet the restraints
continued.
Although the agreements and sale practices of the parties and a continuing
exclusive interchange of technological information, patented and unpatented, still
buttress the division of territories obtaining among Timken and its foreign cartel
associates, the Government pressed the view that the Timken name and marks are
probably by now the most solid reinforcement behind the anti-competitive understanding of the parties. The defendant, on the other hand, attempted to defend the
attacked arrangements on the ground that they were ancillary to the licensing of
trade-mark rights. Under the agreements, the British and French companies are
prohibited from manufacturing, selling, or dealing in bearings except under the
name "Timken." This of course prevents them from building up good will in
any other mark and thus from creating competition, because the parties to the
agreement can employ trade-mark infringement suits and detention by the customs
authorities as legal weapons to prevent any importation of "Timken" bearings into
areas reserved to them. Not only must the co-conspirators put all their distributional
and promotional eggs into Timken's basket; they automatically lose both the eggs
and the basket if they do not renew their present agreements not to compete. Upon
the termination of the present agreements, the British and French companies are
obligated to eliminate "Timken" from their corporate name, to refrain from using
it, and, in so far as practicable, to assign to American Timken their rights in the
Timken name. Since the good will of the co-conspirators has been completely
focused on the Timken trade-mark for the past thirty-nine years (and will be for
a total of fifty-six years if the the present agreements are allowed to run out), the
Government contended that the co-conspirators had a veritable Hobson's choice between destroying their business and terminating their illegal cartel arrangement.
It was also stressed in the Government's brief that the American defendant and
its foreign cartel associates have not only refrained from direct shipments into each
other's territories, but they have dissuaded importers, exporters, distributtrs, automobile dealers, and others from buying bearings from one cartel partner and reselling those bearings in the territory of a different cartel partner. Furthermore, since
the British and French companies are prohibited from dealing in bearings under
any other mark than "Timken," and the defendant Tinken Company is the only
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company that can make roller bearings thus marked in the United States, Timken's
domestic competitors, as well as their distributors or dealers, are completely foreclosed from supplying any demands which the British and French companies might
have for American-manufactured ball bearings. The rival American manufacturers
are much smaller than Timken, and yet they must compete individually against the
combined world-wide advertising and promotion of Timken products by Timken
and its British and French cartel associates, who are three of the largest manufacturers of tapered roller bearings in the world. Furthermore, since users customarily
replace worn-out or defective bearings with bearings of the same make, Timken and
its foreign cartel associates have a very great advantage over outside competition in
securing the market for replacement of bearings originally installed by them. Finally, as far back as 1926 and 1927, counsel was informing the defendant that the Timken name in England "has been frequently used in a context which suggests that
it describes a type of bearing rather than trade origin," and "in Germany we understand that 'Timken' is more or less equivalent to 'tapered.'" On this basis, the Timken trade name's potentiality for excluding competitors from international trade was
undoubtedly magnified, for whoever had the right to use it had the right to use a
generic name.
The defendant, according to the Government, was able to achieve this exclusionary position despite the fact that the Timken mark was so weak that it is allegedly
unregistrable under the Trade-Mark Act of 19o5 and on the principal register provided for by the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946. In fact, the mark is not even
registrable, as such, on the supplemental register provided for by the Lanham Act.
Furthermore, as Judge Freed's opinion recognized, Timken has never had worldwide rights in the name "Timken," by virtue of either registration or actual user,
but on the contrary for almost forty years has foreclosed itself almost completely
from using the name in many important markets of the world. Add to this that
"Timken" was already recognized as a generic or descriptive name in some important commercial countries. Moreover, because of the concurrent use of the same
mark by the defendant and its British and French co-conspirators, the purchasers
of "Timken" bearings run a good chance of being deceived as to whose bearingsTimken's, or the British or French company's-they are actually getting. Accordingly, it would appear that it is not the legal strength of a trade-mark, but its economic maneuverability, that gives it potency.
Judge Freed's negativing of Timken's trade-mark licensing defense was unequivocal. He pointed out that,, by virute of Timken's earlier agreements not to compete, it did not own, had not registered, and could not use the "Timken" mark in
a great portion of the world. Necessarily, Timken could not license what it did
not own. Also, the trade-mark's function was to distinguish the goods of one seller
fror those of another, thereby safeguarding his good will and protecting the pub-

TRADE-MARKS, MONOPOLY, AND THE RESntAINT OF COMPETITION

341

lic from deception. The trade-mark was not a right in gross, and could not be made
a "tool to circumvent free enterprise and unbridled competition.""

B. Division of Fields
Cartel partners can be limited not only territorially but also as to fields of pro-

duction. When two firms engage in business involving commodities which are
not of the same descriptive properties, the use of the same mark by both firms would
prevent either from expanding into the field of trade of the other. 8 Thus I. G.
Farben has limited the use of the "Agfa" trade-mark in the United States by General Aniline and Film (and its predecessor companies) to the photographic film
industry, while it has used the mark on a host of industrial products, including
artificial threads and fibres, dyes, medicines, pharmaceuticals, perfumes, and even
cocoa and chocolates.P Similarly Bayer Company's use of the "Bayer" and Bayer
Cross marks was not only restricted by I. G. Farben to the United States, Canada,
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Cuba, but, even within Bayer Company territory such
as the United States, I. G. Farben reserved the right to use those marks on dyes and
dyestuffs 0 This latter commercial limitation becomes peculiarly inhibiting and
stultifying when one considers the increasing scientific intertwining between sulfa
drugs and sulfa dyes. What possible public interest inheres in having the same
mark used by the one company on sulfa drugs and by the other on sulfa dyes?
Or in having scientific research stop at an artificial commercial frontier, merely
because the use of a commercial label stops at that frontier?
C. Division of Markets and Discriminatory Pricing
Not only -may a trade-mark pattern illegally divide territories and fields of
production, but it may promote a division of markets and a discriminatory treatment
of those markets that may run afoul of the antitrust laws. In the usual case, that
discrimination takes the form of differential price treatment. Thus, in United
States v. Rohm and Haas, the identical molding powder, methyl methacrylate, was
sold for general construction and manufacturing purposes under the marks "Crystalite" and "Lucite" at 85 cents per pound, and for the making of dental plates
under the names "Vernonite" and "Crystalex" at $45 per pound. Only two companies distributed Rohm and Haas' product to the dental trade.6 1 The consent
judgment entered against Rohm and Haas requires compulsory sale of methyl
methacrylate to dental customers.62
" Compare the discussion later on in this article of the use of trade-marks by related companies,
infra. judge Freed likewise held against Timken on its other defenses that the restraints were (i) reasonable, (2) ancillary to Timken's formation of a "joint venture" with the British and French companies, and (3) ancillary to Timken's furnishing technical information and "know-how" to those
companies.
" See Beechnut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F. 2d 967 (C. C. A. 3 d 1925), afl'd, 273 U. S.
629 (1927).
" See Diggins, supra note 39, at 129-13X.

sId. at 127-r28.
eHearings before the Senate Committee on Patents on S. 23o3 and S. 249r, 77 th Cong., 2d Sess.
663 et seq. (1942).
"5 Art. VII of Final Judgment in United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., supra note 45.

342

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

In a proceeding in 1936, the Federal Trade Commission found a price discrimination in violation of Section 2 of the Clayton Act in the fact that Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Company gave Sears, Roebuck a lower price than it gave its other customers. The discrimination was made possible only by calling the tires sold to
Sears, Roebuck "All State" and "Companion," naming those sold to the rest of the
trade "All Weather" and "Pathfinder," and concealing from the general trade the
common source of manufacture of all these sets of tires.0 3

The use of "fighting brands" is one of the most ancient of illegal antitrust restraints involving the use of trade-marks. Thus, in United States v. American
Thread Company, 4 a combine was formed in the thread industry which monopolized the sale of threads and removed several brands from the market. However,
when an independent manufacturer would begin to build up an appreciable business, the agents of the combined companies would revive one of their retired brands,
sell it below the cost of production to customers of the independent manufacturer,
and put on "flying squadrons" to handle these "fighting brands." False reports
were alleged to have been made, among other matters, that the independents were
using infringing brands. In the decree entered in the case, the defendants were
enjoined from acquiring the brands of competitors; from using fighting brands or
flying squadrons (fighting brands being defined as brand offered at prices lower
and on terms more favorable than those asked by the seller for substantially the same
threads under different brands or names);"5 and from harassing and intimidating
by threatening to prosecute for trade-mark infringement."'
D. Pre-emption of Markets and Uniform Price-Fixing
Shifting from price discrimination between markets accomplished by trade-marks
to the use of marks to pre-empt markets and to promote price uniformity, we come
to United States v. General Electric Company, the only litigated case, besides Timken, involving trade-mark abuse in contravention of the Sherman Act.07 In this
case, General Electric agreed to let Westinghouse use the "Mazda" mark, but declined to let its other patent licensees do so. In addition, General Electric and Westinghouse persuaded public bodies to include in their specifications the requirement that lamps to be furnished those bodies be "Mazda" or "Mazda or equal," a,
provision which the court held was designed to exclude, and had the effect of excluding, competitors from the municipal market, and therefore violated Section i
of the Sherman Act.
It is a truism that uniform price fixing, and the adoption of uniform distribue In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F. T. C. 232 (Docket No. 2116, cease and desist order
entered March 5, 1936). Later reversed sub. nom. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, ioi F. 2d 62o (C. C. A. 6th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 557 (1939).
6, D. N. J., Eq. No. 312, consent judiment entered June 2, 5954.
e' See Arts. VI(c), (g), (h), and (k) of the consent judgment, supra note 64.
"The complaint, it may be noted, charged sales "below cost."
" United States v. General Electric Co. (D. N. J. Civ. Action No. 1364, Jan. 27, 1941). Note
particularly paragraphs 307 to 310, inclusive. The opinion is reported in 82 F. Supp. 753 (x949).
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tion and production policies, are possible only where the product is of a substantially
uniform nature. A trade-mark can frequently be a guarantee that a product is of
such uniform nature. In fact, this was the way trade-marks functioned in the
lumber industry, in which there have been several antitrust cases. Characteristic is
the case brought against the Southern Pine Association and its members, where' the
trade-mark "SPA" was used to indicate that the lumber had been graded and
inspected by the association.6 All of the "big mills," which produced 47 per cent
of the total production of southern pine lumber but constituted only 4.2 per cent
of the number of mills, were members of the association and subscribers to its
grading and marking service. The vast majority of the "small mill" operators,
consisting of 95.8 per cent of the mills and producing 53 per cent of the total production, were neither members nor subscribers. The association so formulated and
administered its grading and grade-marking rules than an unfair competitive advantage was given to the products of its members. As in the case of the Mazda lamp,
extensive campaigns were conducted to have localities use only association trademarked lumber for building construction. The Southern Pine Association was
successful in preventing competing trade groups from getting public recognition
for their own trade-marks. Lumber manufacturers, under the compulsion of losing
their trade, were compelled to subscribe to the association's grading and marking
services. These manufacturers were obligated to comply not only with the grading
and inspection rules of the association but also with distribution and production
policies, designed to fix uniform prices for lumber, which were considered by the
Department of Justice violative of the antitrust laws. The decree entered in the
civil case against the Southern Pine Association provided for the erection of an
autonomous bureau, to be separate from the association and to be known as the
Southern Pine Inspection Bureau, which was to carry on all grading, standardization,
inspection, and grade-marking activities. The services of this bureau were to be
available at all times on equal terms to all manufacturers of southern pine without
discrimination and without any requirement that they join the Southern Pine
Association or any other trade association. The judgment has numerous detailed
provisions designed to insure non-discriminatory functioning on the part of the
bureau. Charges to be made by the bureau for services were to be fixed to cover
actual cost, and were to be assessed against subscribers without regard to their membership in any trade association. The bureau had its own mark, which was to be
available to all subscribers complying with the bureau's rules with respect to standard grades. In other words, in order to cure the abuse of an ordinary trade-mark,
which had resulted in antitrust violation, there was established for the southern pine
industry what was in effect a certification mark.6 9
" United States v. Southern Pine Association (E.D. La., complaint and decree entered Feb. 21, 1940).
For comparable illicit use of the grading and marking function, see United States v. Western Pine
Association (S. D. Calif., Civ. Action No. 13 89 -RJ, complaint and decree entered Feb. 6, 1941); United
States v. National Lumber Manufacturers Association (District of Columbia, Civ. Action No. 11262,
complaint and decree entered May 6, 1941).
"0Cf. discussion of certification marks, infra.
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E. Adjuncts to Quantity Control
It is another self-evident proposition that any method of identifying a product
contributes to counting it. Voluntary, direct production-limitation schemes have
gone out of fashion because it has always been recognized that they violate the
antitrust laws; the current methods of limiting production are to limit the number
of competitors who engage in an industry, or to limit the industrial capacity of the
industry-indirect methods of accomplishing the objective of production limitation
that are harder to cope with than direct methods. However, in the United States
Pipe & Foundry case 7 patent license agreements provided for the limitation of
production by the manufacturers of centrifugally cast iron pressure pipe by imposing a penalty on a patent royalty basis on pipe produced above a fixed amount.
One of the methods capable of use in enforcing this limitation was the requirement
that the pipe manufactured by the so-called "deLavaud" process, by which most of
the pipe in the industry was manufactured, be stamped with the name "deLavaud."
While this was ostensibly desired as a method of quality control, it could have had
considerable advantage as a quantity control. The consent judgment entered in
this case provides that the defendants be restrained from conditioning a patent license
or immunity, or a disclosure of technical information or data, or a sale or lease of
pipe manufacturing machines, upon the requirement that the other parties to the
transaction agree to adopt and use trade-marks or trade names owned or controlled
71
by any defendant.
F. Trade-Marks as General Adjuncts to Domestic Monopoly
It is impossible, of course, to determine in all cases when a potent trade-mark is
the creature or (as possibly in the cases of tobacco and soap) the cause of an alleged
monopoly. When, however, the problem arises of awarding antitrust relief necessary to dissipate the effects of a monopoly, that question becomes academic, because
trade-mark relief can be as effective to that end as other types of relief. Furthermore,
the mere existence of a monopoly over the manufacture or distribution of a product
necessarily confers upon the trade-mark or name for that product that quality of
genericness and indispensability for describing the product that leads courts to
declare the mark or name to be in the public domain. Thus, in the A. B. Dick
case provision was made for the dedication of the trade-mark "mimeograph" both
in this country and in foreign countries and for debarring the defendant from
using the trade-mark in any way to interfere with imports or exports.l7 In
United States v. Gamewell, the defendant was charged with acquiring trade-marks
as well as patents on fire-alarm equipment for the purpose of securing and maintaining a monopoly of the manufacture and sale of such equipment, and of filing or
10

United States v. U. S. Pipe and Foundry Co. (D. N. J. Civ. Action No. 10772). The summary
in the text takes no account of the trade-mark feature of U. S. Pipe and Foundry Company's lease-license
agreement with a Mexican corporation.
"r d., Art. V(e) of Final Judgment of July 21, 1948.
72United States v. A. B. Dick Co. (N. D. Ohio, Civ. Action No. 2488, entered
March 25, 1948),
Arts. III.ii(b), IIl.12(c), VII.i.
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threatening to file patent and trade-mark infringement suits for the purpose of
eliminating others from the selling of fire-alarm equipment 3 In the consent judgment in that case, Gamewell was enjoined from threatening to bring or bringing
any suit based on seventeen enumerated trade-marks, except such as might be necessary to insure that other users of those marks indicate the source of origin of the
trade-marked products.7 4
With these judgments may be compared the consent judgment entered recently
against the American Optical Company and others, where similar provision was
made against the defendants' suing on any of six trade-marks, except for the taking
of steps necessary to prevent deception of the public and to indicate source of
origin.' In the American Optical case, the dedication was a corollary to depriving
the defendants of their patent monopoly, rather than an effort to divest a defendant
of any other economic monopoly. The "Numont" eyeglass frame patent monopoly,
for example, was used as the basis for industry-wide patent licenses fixing the
manufacturers' sales price for "Numont" frames. In addition to this, the patent
license imposed the additional requirement that the licensee manufacturers use the
trade-mark "Numont," so that the resale price of "Numont" frames might also be
fixed. Thereby there was achieved for the industry both horizontal price-fixing
(through the patent licenses) and vertical price-fixing (through resale price maintenance contracts based on trade-marks). This, plus the possibility that the patent
restraint might be revived in the shape of similar trade-mark control, was the basis
for the additional provision in the judgment prohibiting the defendants from requiring patent licensees to use any specific trade-mark.7 6

IV
THE LANHAM Acr

The proponents of the Lanham Act have stressed that the purpose of the Act
77
is to promote competition, and that the antitrust laws are completely unaffected.
There is no indication in the statute to the contrary. In fact, specific language in the
8
statute deprives trade-marks used to violate the antitrust laws of enforceability7
Thus there would seem to be every assurance that no judge savoring the full flavor
of the Line Material and Paramountdecisions, with their insistence on the overriding
" See paragraphs so(c) and (i) of complaint (D. Mass., Civ. Action No. 6i5o).
", Art. V(E) of Final Judgment, entered March 22, 1948.

" United States v. American Optical Co. (S. D. N. Y., Civ. Action No. IO-39i) Art. IX of Final
Judgment of September 17, 1948.

"' Id., Art. XI. The resale price maintenance contracts were, of course, also required to be canceled.

Id., Art. XII.
"' "Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between
competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other." H. R. No. 219, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1945); SEN. R p. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946).
This is farther than the
"'Section 33(b)(7), 6o STAT. 438, 15 U. S. C. §iii5(b)(7) (X946).
Supreme Court went with respect to abused patents in the Hartford-Empire (323 U. S. 386 (1945)) and
National Lead (332 U. S. 319 (1947)) cases. For the division of views as to the legal impact of this
provision, see infra.
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scope of the antitrust laws, would permit trade-marks to become an instrumentality
for making a breach in the coverage of the antitrust laws.7" ' Why then any anxiety?
The answer is that successful antitrust policy must be both preventive and keyed
to the problems of enforcement. Thus, there can be many a slip between the legislative chalice and the judicial lip. Policy may be safe and solid at the Olympian
level where it is on occasion enunciated-the Congress and the Supreme Courtand yet become a bit bedraggled and haphazard at the level of practice where it
must continually live. Congress has arguably given additional support in the Lanham Act to the view that a trade-mark is an independent, substantive property
right, rather than a mere signpost keeping would-be tort-feasors from engaging in
unfair competition. One may rely on antitrust defendants who use trade-marks
to support that view, for it is not unusual for such defendants to defend their
attacked trade restraints by asserting them to be proper exercises of their property
rights. Furthermore, one of the most characteristic features of an antitrust conspiracy is its capacity to make illicit use of innocent instrumentalities such as trademarks. 79 Since the major obstacle to antitrust enforcement has not been unfavorable
court judgments but the attrition of cumbersome and dilatory court proceedings,
any legislation which, even by unwarranted inference, can be included in an antitrust
defendant's pleadings or briefs deserves careful watch.
Moreover, the basic social problem of antitrust is only fragmentarily depicted in
court litigations. A legal development may not rise to the dignity of inclusion in a
formal antitrust proceeding, and yet have serious potentialities for the stifling of
competition and the spread of monopoly. Thus, it becomes pertinent to this discussion to raise such questions as these: Are the protections of the Lanham Act
of a kind which in the long run inure primarily to the benefit of the large national
corporations, or will they be equally beneficial to small businesses? To what extent
will private suits involving trade-marks and trade names have an influence on
competition over and above their role in conserving whatever "property" values the
litigants think are inherent in the mark? Can the procedures and policies of the
Patent Office mitigate undesirable anti-competitive effects of trade-mark protection?
How much of the traditional common-law trade-mark philosophy in favor of competition will permeate the interpretation of the Lanham Act, and thereby still further
lessen the probability of anti-competitive use of trade-marks?
It is in the light of questions such as these that we should analyze the Lanham
Act. Basically, it is the writer's view that the conventional judicial theory of trademarks as indications of source of origin is, in the ordinary case, not inimical to
competition. If the Lanham Act is interpreted in accordance with that conventional
"' Since this article was prepared, Judge Freed, in the Timken case, supra note 56, has stated that
the legislative history of the Lanham Act clearly discloses that the Act was not intended to undermine
the antitrust laws.
"An illegal conspiracy may consist of legal parts. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 205-2o6
(1904); Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396 (x9o5); United States v. American
Column and Lumber Co., 263 Fed. 147, 151-152 (W. D. Tenn. x92o).
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theory, then its untoward effects on competition will be minimized. On the other
hand, if the Lanham Act is construed to involve any substantial redefinition of the
orthodox trade-mark concept, its effect will be anti-competitive. In favor of not
giving the ordinary post-Lanham Act mark any broader legal scope than the preLanham Act mark is the fact that the Act has validated a new species of mark,
ringed around with special safeguards, to assume the so-called quality or "guarantee" function-the certification mark. Also the mere fact that a trade-mark, psychologically speaking, may generate a wider chain of associations than the "source of
origin" is no reason why the law should afford these other associations legal recognition. Law, after all, is a normative discipline, and is under no obligation to be a
general register of psychological sensations and social reactions. To say, therefore,
that a trade-mark connotes to a buyer quality or workmanship is to record one of
many possible observable reactions to the use of the mark, but except with respect
to certification marks it is a reaction with little legal significance.
In the interests of summarily covering a wide legislative terrain with some semblance of clarity, seemingly dogmatic answers may be given to some questions. However, this is a purely surface matter, because we are dealing with a statute that is
inspired by divergent philosophical theories of trade-mark protection which were
not effectively reconciled, is unclear in many spots, and has thus far been the subject
of very little judicial interpretation. Obviously such a statute permits of little
dogmatism.
A. New Types of Marks Subject to Registration-Incontestability
Much has been made in earlier sections of this article of the parsimony of the
courts in permitting the exclusive appropriation of a mark by would-be appropriators. The Lanham Act shows a surface intention to let down the bars. Thus
Section 2 lays down as a general principle that "no trade-mark by which the goods
of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its nature." Furthermore, the Act
provides that trade-marks used in connection with services may be registered,
thereby giving protection to "audible" marks such as radio slogans and advertisements. The registration of collective and certification marks is also provided for.
Registrability has been expanded, it has been argued, for marks that are geographical, descriptive (or even misdescriptive), or names or surnames, both under specific
language relating to such marks and by virtue of Section 2(f), which permits the
registration of marks otherwise unregistrable if such marks have "become distinctive
of the applicant's goods in commerce." s° Furthermore, for the first time it is

recognized (in Section 23) that the marks on the Supplemental Register, which
isa continuation of a similar register under the Act of

1920,

may include not only

the conventional types of trade-marks and trade. names but "any ...package, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan, phrase . . .numeral, or device . . ." -Iano VALTER J.

DERENBERG,

tute Lecture, Oct. 16, 1947).

REGISTRABILITY

UNDER

THE

LANHAM

AcT

13-17 (Practising
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348

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

guage which may lead, in the words of an eminent commentator, to "new and
harassing monopolies.""1
Now, of course, the fact that a symbol may be registered by one person does not
of itself legally imply that other persons will be excluded from the use of that
symbol, although there is a psychologically minatory feature about registration; the
main impact of the Lanham Act on competition will be the new legal effectiveness,
if any, given registration. First, registration is made constructive notice of the
registrant's claim of ownership of the mark (Section 22). Second, cancellation proceedings, except for certain specified grounds, must be brought within five years of
the registration (Section 14).s' Third, and most important, in the absence of a cancellation proceeding, the mark becomes incontestable at the end of a five-year period
except for certain provisos (Section 15).
The possible effect of these provisions on, let us say, a young and struggling
business using locally in Arizona or California a mark that is similar to one used by
a large national cor poration is obvious. Trade-mark counsel being something of a
luxury for a small business, it seems reasonable to suppose that the national corporation will register the mark first, even though it be a Johnny-come-lately to the use
of the mark. 'The Arizona corporation may for five years remain oblivious to such
registration or of its right to cancel the registration, in which event it becomes foreclosed from the right to use the mark in territory subsequently developed by it.
If, within the five-year period, it stumbles upon the idea that it should canvass the
Register or bring cancellation proceedings, it must procure representation in Washington, regardless of the state of its pocketbook, regardless of whether the national
corporation is doing any buisness in its area or not, and regardless o whether the
national corporation is even dealing in the same commodity as the local corporation.
For an incontestable registration arguably gives the owner of the registered mark
exclusive rights throughout the United States, 3 and, in the current state of the law,
may subject to suit a non-registering user of the mark even where he uses the mark
84
on a product that the registrant does not produce or even intend to produce.
s'HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 29, at 233. Molengraaff, The Nature of the Trade-Mark, 29 YALE
L. J. 303 (i92o), has pointed out that the properties and qualities of an object, such as weight, color,
shape, size, and character cannot be used as a trade-mark because they form part of the goods and
make them unlike other goods. Hence, such attributes do not distinguish the object from similar goods.
Id. at 304. He also pointed out that a covering or envelope, or label or ticket, cannot be a trade-mark.
Id. at 305-306.
8"The rule has been that laches is no defense to a cancellation proceeding. Proctor & Gamble Co.
v. J. L. Prescott Co., 77 F. 2d 98, xo-io2 (C. C. P. A. 1935).
"3 judge Wyzanski has even held that a registrant may enjoin a purely intrastate use of a mark on
the ground that such local use may adversely affect interstate sales. Cole of California, Inc. v. Collette
of California, Inc., 79 U. S. P. Q. 267 (D. Mass. 1948). This was contrary to what the Supreme
Court had held under the 1905 Act. U. S. Printing and Lithographic Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279
U. S. 156 (x929).
" See HoE, TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 198-199 (Practising Law Institute Lecture, Jan. 15, 1948);
MfIDDLETON, TRENDS IN JtDICIAL INTERPRETATION' 250-251 (Practising Law Institute Lecture, Jan. 22,

1948). Middleton points out, however, that the Lanham Act is still not broad enough on this point to
include the so-called "sponsorship" and "dilution" theories. If this interpretation of §32(l) of the
Lanham Act is correct (which is doubtful), it would represent ultimate triumph for the views of
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The common law, it may be noted, had not been friendly to the notion that the
owner of a trade-mark could pre-empt the use of that mark for all of interstate commerce if he himself used it only in a limited geographical area, 5 or if he used it with

respect to a so-called noncompeting commodity or a commodity differing significantly
from that of an alleged infringern 8

There would seem to be something anti-com-

petitive about allowing a resource, symbolic and conceptual though it may be, to be
monopolized by people who do not exploit it themselves yet may prevent its exploitation by others. 7
The pre-emptive scope given a registered mark is accentuated by the tendency on
the part of many national corporations to register a great number of marks, more

than they really need. Thus some corporations register "alternative" marks, which
are in fact designations of different grades of the same article and therefore, in the

view of some critics, should not be registered at all. Other large corporations tend
to register "family trade-marks" or "associated marks," e.g., a series of a dozen or so
marks such as "Wheaties," "Oaties," etc. This also is a trend of which serious com-

mentators have been critical 8 8
While it is possible to interpret the Lanham Act as adding to the general defenselessness of small business (and in fact the outlook of the Justice Department and
F. T. C. representatives at the Congressional hearings was inky in its pessimism), a
more optimistic outlook may also be justified. There is no necessary correlation be-

tween the administrative registration or lack of registration of a trade-mark and its
validation and enforcement by the courts.8 9

The Second Circuit has, even since

the passage of the Lanham Act, repeated the prevailing doctrine that registration of
a mark confers only procedural advantages and does not enlarge the registrant's
Schechter, supra note so. Possibly the internal procedures of the Patent Office may constitute a limiting
safeguard. Rule 16.3 provides that original applications for registration shall be limited to a single
one of 50 specified classes of products (see also Rule 16.1). The fee for each original application is
$25.oo (Rule 2.1), so efforts to cover several classes may prove quite costly. However, classification
does not limit or extend the applicant's rights (Rule 16.1).
"'The common-law rule was that the mark must connote the owner's product in a given area before
he could prevent its use by others in that area. Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U. S. 460, 463-464
(1893); Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 323 (U. S. 187); U. S. Printing and Lithographic Co. v.
Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U. S. x56 (5929); United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 98 (1918).
Each trade-mark owner owns the mark in the territory he occupies. Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (sgs6).
" See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 380 (1926); Dwinell Wright Co. v.
White House Milk Co., 132 F. 2d 822, 824 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) (coffee and tea sufficiently related to
milk). The problem has always been to determine when a manufacturer is associated with a commodity
he does not produce. Obviously, as Judge Learned Hand points out, it is no harm to the seller of a
steel shovel to have his mark used on a lipstick. See L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. 2d 272, 273
(C. C. A. 2d 1934) (carry-over from fountain pens to razor blades).
"' The dangers of concurrent registration as a prelude to division of territories or fields have already
been explored. The Lanham Act treatment of the problem of concurrent registration is set forth infra.
88
DERENBERG, op. cit. supra note 8o, at 8-9; ABr, TRADEMARKS FROM THE AnvEst'nsa's POINT OF
VIEw 287 (Practising Law Institute Lecture, Oct. 30, 1947). See also Albany Perforated WrappingPaper Co. v. Hoberg Co., I02 Fed. 157, 159 (C. C. E. D. Wis. goo).
"See E. F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., x36 F. 2d 512, 518 (C. C. A. 6th 1943), and
cases therein cited.
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substantive rights;"0 that the test of trade-mark infringement differs little, if any,
from the test of unfair competition;"' and that the test of unfair competition is
whether the public is likely to be deceived, i. e., whether it thinks that the goods are
the goods of another person.9 2 The courts have given enforcement, because of a derived secondary meaning, to trade-marks which were denied registration because of
their descriptive or geographical characteristics;9 3 conversely, they have denied validity
to marks of indisputably ancient origin and registration.9 4 There is therefore no certainty that even the Lanham Act's permission to register marks which, though
otherwise unregistrable, have become distinctive of the registrant's goods, will bear
any substantive judicial fruit.
Furthermore, given a considered and conservative interpretation by the Patent
Office and the courts, the notice and incontestability features of the statute may lose
a considerable part of their anti-small-business sting. Thus, the statute itself allows
for cancellation and for exceptions to the rule of incontestability for abandonment,
fraud, misrepresentation, etc., which have led to considerable doubt as to whether
incontestability means very much. A recent article points out twenty-one different
grounds in the Act for contesting a mark; 5 the National Association of Manufacturers Subcommittee on Trade-marks is clamoring for strengthening amendments to
the Act;" and even optimists about incontestability will concede that over-populari7
zation or misuse of a mark deprives it of its incontestability.
90

Best & Co. v. Miller, 167 F. 2d 374 (C. C. A. 2d 1948) ("Lilliputian Bazaar" case). For cases

prior to the Lanham Act stating the prevailing doctrine, see Armstrong Co. v. Nu-Enamcl Corp., 305
U. S. 315, 322, 324 (1938); Emerson Electric Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., xo5
F. 2d 9o8-9io (C. C. A. 2d 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 616 (1939); George W. Luft Co. v. Zande
Cosmetic CO., X42 F. 2d 536, 541 (C. C. A. 24d 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 756 (1944). Stated
another way, a valid registration confers on the registrant only the right to sue in a federal court, a right
which would usually be his under the diversity jurisdiction in any event. See Standard Brands v.
Smidler, supra note 13, at 36; Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F. 2d 33 (C. C. A.
2d 1937).
" See, in addition to the Best & Co. and Armstrong cases, supra, American Steel Foundries v.
Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 380 (1926); HARRY D. Nims, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKs 8 et seq. ( 4 th ed. 1947); Handler and Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and
Synthesis, 30 COL. L. Ray. 168, 758 (1930).
"2 S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F. 2d 427, 429 (C. C. A. 2d 1940); Eastern Wine Corp. v.
Winslow-Warren, Ltd., supra note 15, at 960; General Finance Loan Co. v. General Loan Co., 163 F. 2d
709, 712 (C. C. A. 8th 1947). An intention to deceive, if futile, is not actionable. See Kann v. Diamond Steel Co., 89 Fed. 706, 712 (C. C. A. 8th 1898).
"' Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 Fed. 2d 402 (C. C. A. 3 d 1924) ("Dyanshine"); McIlheny Co. v. Gaidray,
253 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 5th x918); McIlheny Co. v. Bulliard, 265 Fed. 705 (D. La. 1920); McIlheny
v. Trappey, si T. M. Rep. 397 (D. La. 1921), afl'd, 28x Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 5th 1922), all dealing with
"*Tabasco" sauce.
", Compare two recent infringement suits, one dealing with a validly registered mark in use since
1879, where the courts denied relief on the ground that the mark was descriptive. National Nu-Grape
Co. v. Guest, 164 F. 2d 874 (C. C. A. ioth 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 874 (1948); Best & Co. v.
Miller, supra note 9o.
" Williamson, Trademarks Registered Under the Lanham Act Are Not "Incontestable," 37 T. M. Rep,
404 (947).
"' See report of March 24, 1948. These amendments are embodied in the measure introduced by
Senator Hawkes at the last session of Congress, S. 1919, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (1947).
*'Derenberg, The Status of Existing Trademark Registrations Under the New Trademark Act of
1946, 3 FOOD, DRUG, AND CosMnTIc L. Q. 270, 277-278 (1948).
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The proponents of the Lanham Act testified that, where a mark loses its signifi-

cance as an indication of origin and becomes generic, it would be considered
abandoned under the Act, which would mean that it could not become incontestableY8 Supplementing this, the Lanham Act incorporates a Senate amendment to
the effect that "no incontestable right shall be acquired in a mark or trade name
which is the common descriptive name of any article or substance, patented or
otherwise. '
Furthermore, since the passage of the Lanham Act, the Seventh
Circuit has vigorously denounced the monopolistic implications inherent in the
attempt by the owner of a trade-mark ("Sunkist") used on fruits and vegetables to
ban its use on bread.'O° There have been other expressions of judicial distaste for the
application of a trade-mark to a commodity differing from that of the trade-mark
owner. 1 Even from Judge Clark, who has taken the view in dissent that the
Lanham Act has enlarged the common law of trade-marks, there seems to be a
discernible antipathy to the notion of trade-marks on "shapes" of objects. 10 2
There are other substantial protections in the language of the statute itself. Defenses are specifically provided against trade-mark infringement suits (Section 33)The abuse of marks in certain critical situations is carefully guarded against, e.g.,
certification marks, patented articles, use by related companies. The Lanham Act
itself is an unclear and ambiguously worded statute, and contains words of broad
content which the courts may interpret in accordance with the traditional procompetitive policy of the common law in the past. To say, however, that the hazards
to small business are problematic and psychological in character, and that the courts
are ultimately there to mitigate those hazards, is not to rob them of their ponder-

ability.
We now pass to specific classes of marks that were possible instrumentalities of
antitrust abuse and examine how they are handled in the Lanham Act.
"3See testimony of Daphne Robert in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Patents on H. R. 82, 7 8th Cong., 2d Sess. oo (1944); testimony of Robert W. Byerly in Hearings before
the House Committee on Patents on H. R. 82, 78th Cong., ist Sess. 27 et seq. (943); testimony of
Wallace H. Martin, id. at 34. But c. testimony of Arthur T. Vanderbilt, id. at 21 et seq. Handler,
supra note 29, at 231, raises the doubt that §45 of the Lanham Act may so define abandonment as to
preclude the cancellation of marks which lose their distinctiveness through no fault of the registrant.
" Section 15(4) of the Lanham Act, 6o S-rAT. 433, 15 U. S. C. §Io65(4) (946).
This must be
distinguished from the Senate amendment relating specifically to patented articles.
as See California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F. 2d 971, 974 (C. C. A.
The court also stressed that confusion as to source of origin was essential to constitute
7 th 1947).
infringement of the mark under the Lanham Act. Id. at 973. The defendant's mark, it may be noted,
was registered only in Iowa and Illinois, whereas the unsuccessful plaintiff's mark had been registered
in the Patent Office.
.01See S. C. Johnson & Sons v. Johnson, supra note 92; Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk
Co., 132 F. ad 822, 825 (C. C. A. 2d 1943); Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein & Co., 533 F. 2d
853, 855 (C. C. A. 7d 1943); National Fruit Products Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D.
Mass. 1943), afl'd, 140 F. 2d 618 (C. C. A. Ist 1944); Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition: Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-trust, Trade-Mark, and Unfair Competition Suits, 53 YALE L. J. 514, 539
( ...S944eC
See his opinion for the court in Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lander, 164 F. 2d 395 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
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B. Certification Marks
One class of marks that has been given special statutory sanction by the Lanham
Act consists of certification marks. These, roughly speaking, are "marks used upon
or in connection with the product or services of one or more persons other than the
owner of the mark to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy or other characteristics of such goods or services .. ." (Section
4). Because certification marks were susceptible of abuse as to consumers and had
been a vehicle of antitrust violation, their introduction into the Lanham Act aroused
considerable apprehension. This apprehension has been largely, if not completely,
met by a Senate amendment providing that a certification mark can be canceled at
any time if the owner does not control or cannot legitimately control the use of the
mark, or engages in the production or sale of the goods or services on which the
mark is used, or permits the use of the mark in any way other than as a certification
mark, or discriminates against applicants for use of the trade-mark in the certification of that applicant's goods and services. Such cancellation proceedings can be
initiated, as can all cancellation proceedings, by "any person who believes that he is
or will be damaged by the registration of a mark"; however, the Federal Trade
Commission is also authorized to bring cancellation proceedings. In view of the
historic role of that Commission in policing the fraudulent and deceptive use of
trade-marks, this is an important provision. The requirement that the owner
"legitimately" control the use of his mark means that no rights inhere in a mark
where such control is a consequence of an illegal cartel agreement or other antitrust
practices, as in the General Electric case.103 Furthermore, the availability of the
certification to all whose products conform to certain standards or conditions is a
strong guarantee against the restrictive and and-competitive use of the mark, provided of course that the owner of the certification mark operates in good faith. In
this connection the reader will wish to refer to the practices complained of, and the
0 4
relief awarded, in the Southern Pine Association case.'
C. Concurrent Registrations
Another source of anticipated antitrust abuse was Section 2(d) of the Lanham
Act, providing for the concurrent registration of "the same or similar marks to
more than one registrant when they have become entitled to use such marks as a
result of their concurrent lawful use thereof in commerce." In addition to requiring
that the concurrent use be "lawful," Section 2(d) provides that the Commissioner
of Patents or a court determine that confusion or mistake or deceit would not result
from such registration, and authorizes the Commissioner to prescribe conditions and
limitations as to the place and mode of use of the trade-marks. Nevertheless,
in view of the way in which concurrent use of a mark internationally had promoted international divisions of territories and fields, it was felt that permitting
the concurrent registration of the same mark within the United States would result
o3 See note 67 supra.

"'

See note 68 supra.
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in domestic divisions of territories and fields. Thus far, very little effort has
been made to take advantage of the provision. Perhaps the thorough ventilation,
in the Congressional hearings and in the literature, of the possibility of abusing the
process of concurrent registration has been as effective as a more detailed statutory
effort to foreclose those possibilities would have been. Another reason for the
small number of concurrent registrations may have been the narrow interpretation
1 °5
given the statute and the technical problems attendant upon such registration."
D. Patented Articles
A patent on an article confers on the patentee the right to exclude all others from
the manufacture and sale of the article, and the exercise of that right to exclude
means that whatever name the patent holder gives to his article (e.g., linoleum,
kerosene, cellophane) becomes, for at least seventeen years, the name by which
that article is known to the general public. It is therefore a sound rule that does

not permit a patent monopoly of quite extensive duration to be transferred into a
perpetual one by recognizing a trade-mark monopoly obtained during a period
when no one else could manufacture or sell the patented article. The Supreme Court
06
and the legal and literary community has long recognized this," but the Lanham

Act recognized it at the last moment, by incorporating an amendment, originated by

Senator O'Mahoney but modified in conference, allowing for cancellation of a mark
which has become a common descriptive name of an article or substance on which

the patent has expired.'0 7 Senator O'Mahoney's original amendment would have
imposed a more drastic election on the manufacturer-to choose between his patent

and trade-mark monopoly'-but the amendment as finally adopted does ameliorate
the situation by at least recognizing prevailing law.
E. Use of Marks by Related Companies

On the conventional theory that trade-marks denote source of origin, their licensing has made slight headway with the courts and has been restrictively regarded
by even post-Lanham Act commentatorsjY" More recent proposals for licensing

stem from the conception that trade-marks guarantee the goods themselves rather
10"

See DERENBERG AND MERCHANT, PROBLEMS

N REGISTRATION PRocEDuRE

(Practising Law Institute

Lecture, Oct. 23, 1947). Trade-Mark Counsel for the Patent Office reports that only two or three concurrent-use proceedings have been instituted under §a(d) of the Lanham Act. Derenberg, The Lanham
Trade-Mark clt of 1946, 38 T. M. Rep. 831, 85o (948).
156Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., x63 U. S. x69 (i896); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,
305 U. S. 111 (938); Amiesite Asphalt Co. of America v. Interstate Amiesite Co., 72 F. 2d 946 (C. C.
A. 3d 1934). For a detailed presentation of the legislative background of the provision, and the
federal and state judicial and Patent Office decisions on this point, see Greenberg, The "Patent"
Clause of the Lanham Act, 38 T. M. Rep. 3 (1948). For a recognition of this by a student of language,
see HENRY L. MENCKEN, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE SuPP. I 341 (1945).
..7 Sec. 14(c), 6o STAT. 433, r5 U. S. C. §io64(c) (1946). This provision should be distinguished
from the one which provides that "no incontestable right shall be acquired in a mark or trade name
which is the common descriptive name of an article or substance, patented or otherwise." Sec. 15, 6o
STAT. 433, 15 U. S.C. §io65 (1946).
10' The Senate version of H. R. 1654 provides for cancellation and free contestability at any time for
a mark which "becomes descriptive of a patented article."
"00 HANDLER, op. ctit. supra note 29, at 240-241; HARRY D. Nms, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADE-MARKS §22 ( 4 th ed. 1947).
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than the origin of goods." 0 The Lanham Act for the first time gives specific recognition to marks which serve the guarantee function, i.e., certification marks (Section 4). The question for consideration-and it will continue to be vexing unless its very vexatiousness makes it academic-is whether by Section 5 of the Lanham
Act, immediately following the section dealing with certification marks, Congress
intended to provide for the licensing of trade-marks.
Section 5 provides that "where a registered mark or a mark sought to be
registered is or may be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure
to the benefit of the registrant or applicant for registration."''
A "related company" is defined as "any person who legitimately controls or is controlled by the
registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality of the
goods or services in connection with which the mark is used.""' Against its common-law background, the provision seems clearly intended to enable a subsidiary
to take advantage of the use of a trade-mark by its parent, and vice versa,"' although
it assumes an element of "control" by a parent that would appear to be impossible
for large corporate complexes like General Motors 1 4 and United States Steel. In
fact, in a mammoth industrial empire is it not really quite a large legal fiction to
assume unity of source of origin? Can one, for example, attribute unitary origin
to the products of a giant holding company like General Motors, engaged in producing a great number of utterly diverse products through a great number of
subsidiary corporations and divisions, which announces as its policy the promotion
of competition in such matters as industrial styling among its various subsidiary
corporations and otherwise strives to foster a really effective decentralization of
operations ?"r
Or look at the situation presented by the program of Botany Mills, Inc., a wellknown woolen manufacturer. Botany in the Thirties decided to go into the consumer field, and we now have "Botany Brand" ties, socks, suits, and topcoats. One
of the five largest men's clothing firms in the country, and at one time several
hundred women's and children's clothing manufacturers, joined with Botany in
advertising and marketing their products under a joint label bearing the Botany
name. What "source of origin" is pointed to in such circumstances? And then,
when Botany Mills decided that it must, to avoid over-producing for the market,
cut down its women's and children's clothing manufacturers to a mere two dozen,
was not the competitive effect on the dispossessed manufacturers clear? What per0

" Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HAv. L. REv. 813 (1927); Isaacs,

Traffie in Trade Symbols, 44 HARv. L. Ev. 1210 (1931); WALTER DERENBERG, TRADnmtnK PRoTECTIoN
AND UNFAIR TRADE 36-39 (1936); Ralston Purina Co. v. Saniwax Paper Co., 26 F. 2d 941 (W. D. Mich,

1928).
...
6o
..
1 60

STAT. 429, 15 U. S. C. §1055 (946).
STAT. 443, 15 U. S. C. §1127 (1946).

... Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v. J. S. Ivins' Son, 7 F. Supp. 211 (E. D. Pa. 1934); Ex parte Steel
Corp., 24 T. M. Rep. 597 (934); Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. Johnson Maple Syrup Co., 272 Fed.
478 (D. Vt. 1921).
"" See Whitman, "You Can License Your Trademark If-" 38 T. M. Rep. 639-640 (1948).
...See PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF TIM CoRPOArzoAr

(1946).
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haps may not have been so clear was the fact that the legal reliance of the dispossessed
manufacturers on the Botany trade-mark accelerated their economic dependence on
Botany Mills. 18
It is also possible that the provision was intended to give statutory recognition to
a few lower-court decisions justifying the "licensing" of a trade-mark by the producer of a fabricated material to a purchaser who transforms it into a finished
product (e.g., "Fruit of the Loom" cloth into "Fruit of the Loom" shirts)". 7 or by the
seller of a product in bulk to a bottler thereof.'1 In many cases, the so-called licensed
trade-mark was wavering on the brink of genericness 0
Be it noted that a mere
purchaser for resale of a trade-marked commodity requires no license in order to
use the mark. Also that nothing prevents the processor or bottler from informing
the public as to the trade-mark of the ingredients or composition of his productY"9
These cases hardly justify the notion that the "licensing" of a trade-mark was a wellaccredited institution at common law. Rather they seem based on the fact that,
while an ordinary distributor cannot legally or commercially harm an original manufacturer by reselling the identical product which he bought from the manufacturer,
a processor or fabricator working on such a product can through lack of skill or
care injure the reputation of the original manufacturer and even subject him to

suit.'"

In fact, the general impression is that the licensing of a trade-mark, generally

speaking, is against public policy.' 2

Now that the Lanham Act provides for certi-

fication marks, we have, as will be shortly pointed out, an instrumentality that will
protect the reputation of an original manufacturer from blemish at the hands of the
unreliable or negligent processor or fabricator.
The requirements that the use of the trade-mark by a third party and the
registrants control of the trade-mark be legitimate were simply amendments, made
by the Senate Patent Committee, intended to avoid any use of a trade-mark to promote an antitrust restraint.'2 Accordingly, it could be urged that use of the same
mark by a parent and its subsidiaries, where the parent-subsidiary industrial complex is a monopoly that should be dissolved, would constitute illegitimate use as
well as illegitimate control of the mark. Furthermore, as a recent commentator
16 Newsweek, Nov. 8, 1948, p. 68.
"11 B. B. & R. Knight Co. v. W. L. Milner & Co., 283 Fed. 816 (N. D. Ohio 1922); H. Freeman v.
F. C. Huyck, 7 F. Supp. 971 (N. D. N. Y. 1934).
11. Coca-Cola Co. v. J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 Fed. 224 (E. D. Ark. 1916); Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett,
238 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 8th i9x6); The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796

(D. Dela. 1920).
...Dixie-Cola Laboratories v. Coca-Cola Co., i7 F. 2d 352 (C. C. A. 4th 1941), cert. denied, 314
U. S. 629 (i94i).
110aSee Prestonettes v. Cty, 264 U. S. 359 (924); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U. S.
125 0947).

'O This seems to have been particularly true of the Coca-Cola cases.
121

See note xo8 supra. This is on the basis that the licensing of trade-marks tends to destroy their

utility as indication of source of origin. Cf. HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 29, at 212; NIMs, op. cit. supra
note 1o9.
2
" " See TAOOART, STATUTORY NEW CoNCEPTS OF TRADEMARK OWNERSIMP 5 (Practising Law Institute
Lecture Nov. 13, 1947).
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states, matters which were illegal restraints of trade when they figured in illegal
patent license agreements would clearly be equally illegal if they accompanied the

use of trade-marks.'2 In fact, the owner of a trade-mark is in a dilemma not
applicable to a patent holder. The common law and Section 5 of the Lanham Act,
assuming that they authorize a trade-mark owner to license his mark, would do so
only on the basis that he control the "nature and quality" of the goods or services
in connection with which the mark is used. Such quality control inevitably restricts
the'area of competition, and such restriction of the area of competition, if pushed too
far, can involve or facilitate an illegal restraint of trade." t And yet failure to control those goods may constitute an abandonment forfeiting the mark.125 Thus there
exists doubt as to both the permissibility and the scope of trade-mark licensing.
The following considerations, though, may serve both to resolve that doubt and to
give us a socially acceptable interpretation of the Lanham Act. Manufacturers and
distributors should, as a general rule, develop their own marks, and not use the
marks of others. The only economic need which compels A to apply to B for the
use of B's mark is that B's mark is generic or descriptive. If, however, the mark
is generic or descriptive, there is no legal or economic justification for such an application; the mark is theoretically free to all. If, on the other hand, a manufacturer
desires to convey to the public an assurance of quality or a standard of workman-

ship, the way to that end is through a certification mark, for which the Act makes
specific provision. And, as Section 4 of the Act recognizes, certification marks
should not be licensed by one competitor to another, for a person who tries to make
or market a competitive article is hardly an unbiased judge of the merits of his
competitor's products. In fact, there is considerable likelihood that a manufacturer
or distributor will either refuse to license his mark to a competitor for an equally
qualified product, or will require, as a quid pro quo for the license, that his competitor conform to other commercial standards and practices than those of quality
or workmanship, i.e., price and other trade restraints.
The kind of situation in which the foregoing analysis might have some utility
is that involved in the recent case of T'iangle Publications,Inc. v. Rohrlich.j1 '

In

that case, Judge Augustus N. Hand sustained the finding of the lower court that
the publisher of the magazine Seventeen could sue the manufacturer of a girdle
bearing the same name on a charge of unfair competition. He held that the use
of the name "Seventeen" to describe apparel would create a belief in the mind of a
teen-age girl that the apparel was advertised or commented on editorially in the
See HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 29.
...See Whitman, supra note 114, at 640; Judge O'Connell, dissenting, in E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 38 T. M. Rep. 666, 673 (C. C. P. A. X948).
.. Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, 3 F. 2d 7 (C. C. A. 8th 1924); Circuit Judge
Major, dissenting, in Purity Cheese Co. v. Frank Ryser Co., 153 F. 2d 88, 9o (C. C. A. 7th 1946);
Judge O'Connell, dissenting, in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, supra
223

note 124.
128

x67 F. 2d 969 (C. C. A. 2d 1948). See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of

America, supra note 124.
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magazine Seventeen. In short, the magazine was a "source of sponsorship," and
its good-will could be damaged if the goods sold by the defendant were inferior
to the high quality which the public attributed to goods actually advertised in or
commented on by the magazine. Since the plaintiff prevailed on this point, it was
not necessary to decide whether the defendant had infringed the registered mark,
which the district court had found to be arbitrary, fanciful, and one that had almost
immediately acquired a secondary meaning. Judge Frank, dissenting, said that
the name "Seventeen" was descriptive; that any secondary meaning attached to it
was limited to the magazine; that no confusion was likely between the magazine
and girdles, which are a non-competing article; and that there was no finding that
the defendant in fact sold goods inferior to those advertised. To this writer it
seems that trade-mark law has enough trouble on its hands without espousing a new
concept like "source of sponsorship."' 2 7 After all, protecting the snob appeal of a
medium of mass advertising is something radically different from protecting the
snobbery of the consumer. If, however, the idea of sponsorship is to gain recognition in trade-mark law, it should be in connection with certification marks rather
than ordinary marks, accompanied by all the safeguards which the Lanham Act
has attached to certification marks.
In an ambiguous and unclear statute, the section on "related companies" is one
of the most equivocal provisions. Registrants would therefore do well to proceed
cautiously, because the Patent Office has no facilities for probing such delicate and
involved issues as "legitimacy" or "restraint of trade."
F. Assignment of Marks
In this day of mergers and consolidations, any easing of the terms and conditions
under which marks may be assigned becomes of considerable significance, because
28
It was
marks may frequently be a most essential element of the merged business.'
of
as
indications
trade-marks,
that
law
trade-mark
of
conventional
cliche
an accepted
source of origin, had no significance except as appurtenant to a going business, and
so it was assumed that they could be assigned only in conjunction with a going busi""The approach taken by the Patent Office in Esquire, Inc. v. Knomark Manufacturing Co., 38
T. M. Rep. 486 (1948), seems far preferable. Esquire, on the ground that it had established itself as a

leading source of authoritative information and advice on the subject of male grooming, argued that the
Esquire mark had acquired a secondary meaning and a "celebrity," and had come to indicate that
any merchandise bearing the mark was approved or sponsored by Esqu;re and met the requirements
set by it for good grooming. On this basis, Esquire entered a petition to cancel a trade-mark registration
applied for by Knomark for shoe polish. The assistant commissioner, in upholding the examiner's
dismissal of the petition, pointed out that there was no reason why a publication even as well known
as Esquire should be treated any differently from any other merchandiser; that its trade-mark rights
could be considered only in connection with the trade in which it was engaged, and did not entitle it
to preclude the registration of marks by others in connection with other products. (Both the Patent
Office and the writer are aware that this was a statutory proceeding for cancellation in the Patent Office
and not an equitable action for unfair competition in a court.)
...See Decree of Dissolution and Injunction in United States v. Eastman Kodak Co. (W. D. N. Y.,
Eq. No. A-5s, entered Feb. x, i92i); cf. United States v. National Gum and Mica Co. (S. D. N. Y.,
Eq. No. 40-276, entered May 27, 1927.
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ness, and that "naked assignments" or "assignments in gross" were invalid.12 When,
therefore, early versions of the Lanham Act provided for the assignability of registered
marks "either with or without the good will of the business, '13 ° they were attacked
as undermining the entire basis of trade-marks and destroying public confidence in
them. Even Section io of the Lanham Act, providing that a mark could be transferred in connection with the "good will or part of the good will" of a business,
was attacked as a prelude to the indiscriminate hawking of marks and to the creation of a property right in marks unrelated to the protection of the consumer.
Putting to one side the delicate and frequently impossible surgery involved in
dividing the good will of a concern into parts, 1 31 the main difficulty with the pro-

vision is its ambiguity. "Good will" is an accordion term. In some cases, where
one is dealing with manufacturing enterprises, or businesses the commercial success
of which is attributable primarily to their location, good will obviously cannot be
transferred except in connection with the transfer of physical property. Once one
retreats from that safe ground to the proposition that the transfer of customers' lists
and mailing lists are sufficient "good will" to support an assignment of a trade-mark,
a subtle verbal transference has taken place. We are in effect passing from a
consideration of the factors which justify good will, and justify consumer reliance
on the "source of origin," to purely fortuitous factors that give businessmen in the
chips a competitive "in." Let us hope, therefore, that the courts will play the
accordion of "good will" with restraint.
G. Defenses to Incontestability and Trade-Mark Infringement
Proceedings-Use of the Mark to Violate Antitrust Laws
Until a registered mark has become incontestable, a defendant in an infringement
proceeding may prove any "legal or equitable defense or defect" available against
the owner of an unregistered mark. However, once the registration has become
"incontestable," the registration is conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive
right to use the mark in commerce. Section 3 3 (b) of the Lanham Act goes on to
list seven specific defenses and defects available against an incontestable mark. The
seventh defense, once more a Senate amendment inserted as a specific antitrust safeguard, has probably been the subject of as much speculation as anything else in the
statute.
"2'Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chemical Co., 113 Fed. 468, 474-475 (C. C. A. 8th igos);
Bulte v. Igleheart Bros., 137 Fed. 492, 498-499 (C. C. A. 7th 19o5); American Broadcasting Co. v.
Wahl, i2i F. 2d 412, 413 (C. C. A. 2d 1941); NIMs, op. &lt. supra note to9, at 86. Good will is
tangible only as an incident, as connected with a going concern or business having a locality or name,
and is not susceptible of being disposed of independently. Metropolitan National Bank v. St. Louis
Dispatch Co., 149 U. S. 436 (1893), cited with approval in Mayer Fertilizer and Junk Co. v. VirginiaCarolina Chemical Co., 35 App. D. C. 425 (1910).

...H. R. 9041, 75 th Cong., 3d Sess. (938); H. R. 4744, 76th Cong., ist Sess. (1939); H. R.
66z8, 76th Cong., ist Sess. (939).
...Reputation is an indivisible sort of phenomenon and hard to place on the accounting table. For
the wrestling of the courts with this problem, see Halliday, Assignments Under the Lanham Alct,
38
T. M. Rep. 970, 973-976 (1948).
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The seventh defense is "that the mark has been or is being used to violate the
antitrust laws of the United States." Senator O'Mahoney was responsible for subsection (7), and he stated, without contradiction from his Senate confreres, that
violation of the antitrust laws is a defense to a suit by the registrant of the trademark.132 That is the view adopted by most commentators. 3 3 However, Congressman Lanham, in explaining the Senate amendment, has stated that the section was
intended not to provide an affirmative defense but merely to destroy the incontestability of a trade-mark and restore registration to its pre-Lanham Act status as prima
34
facie evidence of ownership of the mark.1
To this author, Senator O'Mahoney's construction of his own amendment seems
the only plausible way to read the subsection, both as a matter of policy and of construction. Even authorities who disagree with the policy of the provision as interpreted by Senator O'Mahoney agree that his is the correct interpretation of the
statutory language. 35 Basic to the position of those who disagree with this appears
to be the fear that the comparatively simple enforcement of trade-mark rights may
bog down into a complex and involved antitrust proceeding, and a feeling that
trade-marks are rarely the "legal, causal, and efficient instrumentalities" of an antitrust restraint.136 Now, "legal, causal, and efficient instrumentality to effect a contract or agreement or arrangement which violates the antitrust laws" is remarkable
metaphysical verbiage for senators to use in purported explanation of the simple
statutory expression, "used to violate the antitrust laws." When one considers that
the senators were only trying to describe the antithesis of a "purely physical or coincidental" relation of the trade-mark to the illegal trade restraint, the ponderousness
of this language becomes even queerer. It may safely be surmised that the courts,
in interpreting Section 33 (b) (7), will bear in mind that the other "defenses or
defects" listed in Section 33 (b), such as fraud and abandonment, are obviously defenses to enforcement of a trade-mark, rather than mere dilution of the evidentiary
status of registration as proof of ownership, and will give antitrust violation a similar
legal effect. Furthermore, the doctrine of unclean hands constantly confronts the
antitrust violator and serves to deprive him of substantive rights, even with respect
to that generally more highly respected type of industrial property, the patent.
Finally, even where intention and agreement are basic to an antitrust violation, the
means used to accomplish or maintain that illegal intention and agreement cannot
be dismissed as "purely physical or coincidental" but must likewise be dealt with
13292 CONG. Rac. 7873 (1946).
133 HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 29; WALTER

J.

DERENBERG, PREPARING FOR TIE NEw TRADE A K

LAw 14 (Research Institute of America, 1946); Lockhart, Violation of the Anti-trust Laws as a Defense
in Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REV. 507, 566-568 (1947). Lockhart points out that §33(a) of the Lan-

ham Act would bring about a similar result, even if §33(b)(7) were not construed in accordance with
Senator O'Mahoney's views.
aas92 CONG. REc. 7524 (946); accord, HoGE, op. cit. supra note 84.
...See HANDLER, Op. cit. supra note 29; DERENBERG, op. cit. supra note X33.
15
" For the language used in the Senate debate on this provision, see 92 CONG. REc. 7636 (1946).
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as integral to the offense. The fact that a trade-mark was not historically at the
inner core of a Sherman Act violation does not mean that Section 3 3 (b)(7) is inapplicable to it, if the trade-mark subsequently becomes directly involved in such
violations.
V
SUMMARY

The trade-mark, kept to its sound common-law function as an indicator of source
of origin of a product, could, in the general case, probably facilitate competition by
differentiating the products of competitors. In special circumstances, however, it
becomes a direct vehicle of monopoly power; and not infrequently, as in the case of
quasi-fungible commodities where quality competition is minimal, there is doubt
whether the differentiation accomplished by trade-marks is economically significant

or even relevant. In fact, critics of the trade-mark institution have urged that its
functioning on the whole is largely not in the interest of the consumer, thereby
leaving to it only a limited role as a stimulus to producers and distributors to compete.
In addition to being the basis for legalizing resale price maintenance, through
the Miller-Tydings Act and state legislation, trade-marks have facilitated various

types of illegal restraints of trade. The most heavily documented of these types
has been the division of territories. However, trade-marks have also been used to
bring about illegal division of fields, illegal division of markets and invalid discriminatory price-fixing, pre-emption of markets and uniform price-fixing, quantity
control, and, in general, the support of domestic monopoly.

In its original form as it passed the House, the Lanham Act had several features
discouraging to the proponents of antitrust policy and to those solicitous for the
welfare of small business: expanded types of marks available for registration, covering configuration and contours of packaging; service marks, certification marks, etc.;
incontestability; concurrent registration; use of marks by related companies; assignment of marks, etc. Senate amendments relating to certification marks, the use

of marks by related companies, marks on patented articles, and the availability of
antitrust violation as a defense to infringement suits have assuaged some of these
apprehensions. The future impact of the Lanham Act on competition is uncertain,
but it lies within the framework of what the Patent Office and the courts consider
to be in the public interest, the restraint which the beneficiaries of the Lanham Act
exercise in the enjoyment of their new privileges, and the possibilities for freeing
small business from the uncertainty and trepidation that the Lanham Act has
created for them. The most articulate and broad-gauged of these influences is the
courts, because the basic judicial approach to trade-marks is to regard them as vehicles
of both fair and free competition. The hope of antitrust policy in the future is that
the courts will pursue their sound doctrines, including the basic one that a trade-
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mark indicates source of origin, and discard unsound developments in the light of
contemporary economics and semantics. The courts may bear in mind, for example,
that trade-mark recognition is not the only method of rewarding advertising invent-

iveness; copyrights and design patents are better adapted for this purpose in some
respects. Also, if competition is to be adequately protected, sentimental notions that
competitors are not entitled to a "free ride" must be carefully scrutinized. 13 7 As Mr.
Justice Brandeis has remarked, "Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected
by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and ih the full
exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested."' 38 Assuming, however, that the courts succeed in harnessing the rampant interpretations of the Lanham Act to the chariot of free competition, it would still be necessary to infuse the
judicial independence of spirit, which costs judges nothing in cash, into businessmen,
whom it sometimes costs dear to try out legal theories.
" Judge Frank, dissenting, in Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, x67 F. 2d 969 (C. C. A. 2d 1948);
National Fruit Products Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. X943).
"' Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 122 (938).

